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COMMENT
ABUSE OF THE JOURNALIST'S SHIELD: A STATE-BY-
STATE SURVEY OF BLOGGER LIABILITY FOR TRADE
SECRET MISAPPROPRIATION AND TEXAS'S SHIELD
STATUTES AS A MODEL FOR FEDERAL PREEMPTION
Dustin T. Gainest
I. INTRODUCTION
On August 11, 2011, after over seventeen months of investigation, the
District Attorney of San Mateo County, California, finally charged two
defendants in the case of the missing iPhone.' That day, the most
newsworthy detail that was revealed was not who was charged, but who was
not.2 In its press release, San Mateo County announced that it was charging
two individuals, Sage Wallower and Brian Hogan, for selling an unreleased
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1. Press Release, Stephen M. Wagstaffe, District Attorney of the County of San Mateo,
District Attorney Announces Filing Decision on Misappropriation of iPhone (Aug. 10, 2011)
(on file with author).
The San Mateo County District Attorney's Office has filed misdemeanor
charges against two individuals for the misappropriation of an iPhone 4
prototype that was lost by an Apple employee and subsequently recovered in a
Redwood City establishment by the defendants on March 25, 2010. Brian
Hogan . . . was charged with one count of misappropriation of lost property,
and Sage Wallower ... was charged with misappropriation of lost property, and
possession of stolen property. . . . After a consideration of all of the evidence, it
was determined that no charges would be filed against employees of Gizmodo.
Id.
2. Sarah J. Purewal, Gizrnodo Not Charged in Apple iPhone 4 Prototype Purchase, PC
WORLD (Aug. 11, 2011, 7:05 AM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/237853/gizmodonot
charged-in.appleiphone_.4_prototype.. purchase.html.
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iPhone 4 prototype to Gizmodo.com, but it did not bring charges against
Gizmodo.com or any of its employees for broadcasting pictures and video
footage of the highly secret iPhone 4 prototype months before its scheduled
release.'
Wallower and Hogan's crimes began in March of 2010 at a restaurant in
Redwood City, California. That evening, Gray Powell, a software engineer
for Apple, went to Gourmet Haus Staudt,' a San Francisco area restaurant,
to celebrate his birthday. Powell's personal iPhone was different from the
iPhone commercially available at that time. Powell was using an Apple
prototype-the not-yet released iPhone 4.' Apple was set to release this
model of iPhone on June 24, 2010.' When Powell left the restaurant that
evening, his carelessness led to the story that would dominate the news in
both tech blogs and traditional news outlets for weeks.' When he left the
restaurant that evening, Powell accidentally left the iPhone prototype on his
bar stool.' After he left, Hogan and Wallower found the phone and noticed
that there was something different about Powell's iPhone.'o Apple,
recognizing the public's interest in its unreleased products, took the
precautionary measure of constructing the exterior of the prototype to
resemble the exterior of the iPhone 3GS, which was the latest iPhone
available to consumers at that time." Despite Apple's precautionary
measures, Wallower and Hogan noticed that there were several subtle
differences on Powell's phone.' 2
3. About Gizmodo, GIZMODo, http://gizmodo.com/about/ (play the video) (last visited
Sept. 17, 2012). Gizmodo.com is an online technology website and blog that reviews new
technology and reports on any news within the world of emerging technology. Id.
4. Id.
5. Aff. for Search Warrant at 2-3, Apr. 29, 2010 [hereinafter Warrant Affidavit]. This
affidavit supports California's request for a search warrant of the home of Jason Chen,
founder of Gizmodo.com.
6. Id.
7. Paul Miller, iPhone 4 Announced, Launching June 24 for $199 with New FaceTime
Video Chat, ENGADGET (June 7, 2010, 1:35 PM), http://www.engadget.com/2010/06/07/
iphone-4-announced/.
8. Warrant Affidavit, supra note 5, at 4.
9. Jesus Diaz, How Apple Lost the iPhone 4, GIZMODO (Apr. 19, 2010, 8:10 PM),
http://gizmodo.com/5520438/how-apple-lost-the-next-iphone.
10. Id.
11. Warrant Affidavit, supra note 5, at 2.
12. Diaz, supra note 9, at 2.
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Wallower and Hogan then discovered that Powell worked for Apple, and
they contacted the online technology blog Gizmodo.com.1' After hearing
that Wallower and Hogan were in possession of an unreleased prototype of
Apple's flagship product, Gizmodo purchased the device from Wallower
and Hogan for $5,000.' After acquiring the device, Gizmodo confirmed
that this was indeed an unreleased iPhone." Gizmodo then photographed,
recorded video footage of, and closely analyzed the prototype.16 Five days
later, Gizmodo published its photos, videos, and observations of the
prototype iPhone on its website.' Despite the fact that Gizmodo had
published this information, it was not charged for any crime or sued
civilly." Instead, Apple formally requested that Gizmodo return the
telephone."
Trade secrets are often the most overlooked assets that a corporation
may have.20 This is partly true because trade secrets often involve many
different forms.2 1 While patents must meet specific, statutory requirements,
trade secrets may be any business secret from which a company derives
economic value.22 This is a critical distinction because trade secrets are the
only form of intellectual property that may be either tangible or intangible.23
Technology news sources, like Gizmodo, recognize that technology
companies work very hard to guard the secrecy of unreleased products.
Trade secret law makes it possible to protect intellectual property, including
intangible property, such as Apple's right to unveil its new technology.
When a website, like Gizmodo, purchases information that it knows is
confidential, dissects it, records it on video, and broadcasts it, that website
should be held both criminally and civilly liable for the misappropriation of
13. Warrant Affidavit, supra note 5, at 5.
14. Id. at 6.
15. Jason Chen, This Is Apple's Next iPhone, GIzMoDo (Apr. 19, 2010, 10:00 AM),
http://gizmodo.com/5520164/this-is-apples-next-iphone.
16. Warrant Affidavit, supra note 5, at 2.
17. Id.
18. Press Release, Wagstaffe, supra note 1.
19. Brian Lam, A Letter: Apple Wants Its Secret iPhone Back, GIZMODO (Apr. 19, 2010,
11:50 PM), http://gizmodo.com/5520479/a-letter-apple-wants-its-secret-iphone-back-
20. Henry C. Su, Trade Secrets, in THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY HANDBOOK: A
PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR FRANCHISE, BUSINESS AND IP COUNSEL 261 (William A. Finklestein &
James R. Simms III eds., 2005) [hereinafter IP Handbook].
21. Id. at 262.
22. Id. at 262, 264.
23. Id. at 262.
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the victimized corporation's trade secrets. Some corporations rely heavily
on the field-testing of their products to ensure that the products operate in
accordance with the intended design. Even though Powell lost the iPhone
prototype, an inadvertent mistake of an employee does not grant anyone
the authority to willfully publish information that is known to be secret.
Bloggers are not the only threat to owners of trade secrets. Trade secret
misappropriation can occur in many factual scenarios. Commonly, a
departing employee may leave his company-where he learned and
implemented the company's trade secrets-and then begin working for a
new company. In other cases, an inventor may present his plan or prototype
to a company for review, but, because of the jurisdiction where the alleged
misappropriation occurred, the idea may not rise to the level of protection
that it would receive in virtually every other state.
There are three dynamics that currently make trade secret law difficult to
enforce against those who misappropriate the trade secrets. First, unlike all
other forms of intellectual property, trade secrets are civilly enforced under
state laws and do not benefit from a uniform, federal system of laws like
copyrights, trademarks, and patents." With the advent of the Internet and
modern commerce, business is no longer carried out only on a local scale. It
is carried out in a national and international marketplace and should be
afforded the standardized, civil protection that all other forms of intellectual
property are given. Second, courts today have placed an onerous burden on
corporations to establish whether they have adequately guarded their
secrets.25 Only sufficiently guarded secrets are afforded trade secret status
and protection.26 Third, the use of the Economic Espionage Act27 has been
almost nonexistent since its enactment in 1996.28 Under the Economic
Espionage Act, some trade secret infringement claims are actionable as
criminal offenses.29 In certain bad faith infringement claims, use of the
24. See Economic Espionage Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-1839 (2006). Trade secrets are
enforced criminally under the Economic Espionage Act. Id. §§ 1831, 1832. Under the Act,
there is an ancillary provision for civil injunctions that is only invoked when a defendant is
convicted of violating the Act. Id. § 1836(a). As it stands, there is not a stand-alone provision
within the Act that solely provides civil remedies for trade secret misappropriation.
25. See infra Part II.A.6.b.
26. See 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)(A) (2006).
27. Economic Espionage Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-1839 (2006).
28. See supra Part III.C (statistically noting the lack of EEA enforcement for trade secret
misappropriation).
29. IP Handbook, supra note 20, at 316-17.
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Economic Espionage Act may be the only deterrent to preventing
misappropriation of trade secrets.
Therefore, a new system of uniform enforcement is needed and should
be established to protect the trade secrets of American businesses. This
Comment begins by analyzing the historic context of trade secret protection
and both the civil and criminal penalties that may be imposed upon an
Internet site for disseminating trade secrets against the owner's wishes.
Next, this Comment addresses the historic background of the reporter's
shield and compares it with newsgathering crimes. Finally, this Comment
proposes (1) that Congress should incorporate civil remedies, such as
damages and injunctions, into the Economic Espionage Act to establish
uniformity in the national marketplace; (2) that the onerous burden of
proving that a company adequately protected its trade secrets should be
lessened; and (3) that the criminal component of the revised Economic
Espionage Act should be utilized more frequently than it has been since its
inception in 1996.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Trade Secrets
1. Origins of Trade Secret Law
It is speculated that intellectual property law-specifically trade secret
law-is rooted in the laws of the early Roman Empire.30 The earliest
measures of trade secret protection were rooted in contract, tort, and
30. A. Arthur Schiller, Trade Secrets and the Roman Law; the Actio Servi Corrupti, 30
COLUM. L. REv. 837, 838 (1930). In Roman courts, legal recourse could be taken against a
slave who divulged his master's secrets. Id. at 838. The cause of action was in actio servi
corrupti, which literally means an "action for corrupting the slave." Id. at 839. Schiller states
that in Roman times,
[tihe problem . . . can be stated as follows. The employee (slave) of a business
man (master) is maliciously enticed by a competitor (third person) to divulge
business secrets. The employee thereupon steals secret formulae, plans, lists of
customers, and the like, and turns them over to the competitor; or, as a
corollary, destroys them at the instigation of the competitor; or he divulges
accounts, evidence of the status of the business, or the amount of liabilities and
assets; or he falsifies accounts, reports, or other records.
Id. at 838-39 (footnote omitted). Contra Alan Watson, Trade Secrets and Roman Law: The
Myth Exploded, 11 TUL. EUR. & Civ. L.F. 19 (1996) (arguing the contrary position that trade
secret law does not date back to the early Roman Empire).
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agency law." The earliest trade secret cases did not recognize trade secrets
as a form of intellectual property.3 2 In these early cases, unlawful trade
secret distribution was commonly enforced as a breach of faith, a breach of
confidence, or a breach of an explicitly or implicitly mandated duty that an
employee owed to his employer." The first Western case that began to
develop current trade secret law was the English case Newbery v. James." In
Newbery, the Lord Chancellor denied the plaintiffs specific performance
request because it was impossible to grant an injunction without fully
disclosing and making known to the court and, thus, to the general public,
the complete details of the trade secret."
More than thirty years before any of the early English cases regarding
trade secret law, the framers of the United States Constitution evidenced a
profound interest in protecting and upholding intellectual property rights
for American citizens.36 Article I, section 8, clause 8 of the Constitution
grants Congress the power "[t] o promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries[.]"" In the United States,
Justice Joseph Story labeled the disclosure of trade secrets as "irreparable
mischief," and stated that
courts of equity will restrain a party from making a disclosure of
secrets communicated to him in the course of a confidential
employment. And it matters not... whether the secrets be
31. See TRADE SECRETS: PRAC. GUIDE § 1.7 (2011) (Henry H. Perritt, Jr.) (citing Morison
v. Moat, (1851) 68 Eng. Rep. 492 (Ch.); 9 Hare 241).
32. See id. (citing Green v. Folgham, (1823) 57 Eng. Rep. 159 (Ch.); 1 Sim. & St. 398
(holding that a mere verbal secret that has never been committed to writing is not a form of
intellectual property and that the best remedy would lie in contract or tort law)).
33. See id. (citing Morison v. Moat, (1851) 68 Eng. Rep. 492 (Ch.); 9 Hare 241); cf
Lehman v. Dow Jones & Co., 783 F.2d 285, 299 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding that "[a] cause of
action may arise with respect to information that does not qualify as a trade secret if the
information is disclosed in confidence and later used in a manner that breaches the
confidence").
34. See id. (citing Newbery v. James, (1817) 35 Eng. Rep. 1011 (Ch.); 2 Mer. 446).
35. Id.
36. See Edward C. Walterscheid, Conforming the General Welfare Clause and the
Intellectual Property Clause, 13 HARV. J.L. & TECH.87,90-91 (1999).
37. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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secrets of trade ... or any other secrets of the party important to
his interests.38
The first American case that recognized this concept of trade secret
protection was Vickery v. Welch,39 but Peabody v. Norfolk"o was the first
American case to enforce and protect a trade secret from unauthorized
dissemination." In Peabody, the court recognized that
if [a man] invents or discovers, and keeps secret, a process of
manufacture .. .he has a property in it, which a court of
chancery will protect against one who in ... breach of confidence
undertakes to apply it to his own use, or to disclose it to third
persons.42
The Peabody court's analysis of what constitutes a trade secret, what a trade
secret owner must do to protect it, and what constitutes a breach of
confidence, laid the foundation for modern trade secret law. 43
Trade secret protection is enforced in both the civil and criminal
realms." In the civil realm, the available remedies for misappropriation of a
trade secret are compensatory damages, punitive damages, and
injunctions." In the criminal realm, both state-specific legislation and the
Economic Espionage Act of 1996 (EEA)" govern criminal trade secret
enforcement.47 Violations under the EEA are felony offenses that are
punishable by time served in prison or monetary fines.4 1
38. 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE As ADMINISTERED IN
ENGLAND AND AMERICA § 952 (12th ed. 1877) (footnote omitted).
39. Vickery v. Welch, 36 Mass. 523, 523 (1837) (holding that in a contractual agreement
between parties, a party's promise not to disseminate a trade secret is valuable
consideration).
40. 98 Mass. 452 (1868).
41. Id. at 458.
42. Id.
43. See TRADE SECRETS: PRAC. GUIDE § 1.7 (2011) (Henry H. Perritt, Jr.).
44. IPHandbook, supra note 20, at 319.
45. Id. at 305.
46. Economic Espionage Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-1839 (2006).
47. IP Handbook, supra note 20, at 316-17.
48. Id. at 317.
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2. Relationships to Other Forms of Intellectual Property Law
A patent protects the physical exploration or embodiment of an idea,4 9 a
copyright protects an expression,o and a trade secret indirectly protects
both." When corporation is deciding how to best protect its intellectual
property, each form of property protection has advantages and
disadvantages that vary based upon the purpose of the desired protection.52
a. Patent law
Patents and trade secrets are the most closely-related fields within the
realm of intellectual property.53 Both patent and trade secret laws seek to
protect the owners of intellectual property, but the laws seek to do so in
different ways." A degree of confusion can arise in this area because all
patents are eligible to be protected as trade secrets, but not all trade secrets
are eligible to be protected as patents.
The first major-and most important-distinction between trade secrets
and patents is that patents are inherently public, while trade secrets are
inherently confidential." To qualify for a patent, the applicant must file his
patent application publicly and disclose all of the details of the invention
that he seeks to protect." Under 35 U.S.C. § 112, Congress mandated that a
patent application include a "written description of the invention, and of
the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise,
and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art .. . to make and
49. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (2006).
50. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2006).
51. See infra pp. 94-97. (defining how intellectual property may be eligible for trade
secret, copyright, or patent protection).
52. See infra pp. 94-99. (discussing the advantages and disadvantages of trade secret,
copyright, or patent protection).
53. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480-81 (1974) (discussing the
interface between federal patent policy and state trade secret regulation).
54. IP Handbook, supra note 20, at 237-38.
55. Kewanee Oil Co., 416 U.S. at 494 (Marshall, J., concurring) (recognizing that the
duration of trade secrets is superior to that of patents).
56. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006). Patent applicants must disclose all of the details and
diagrams of their invention to the United States Patent and Trademark Office when applying
for a patent. Id. But cf RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION: DEFINITION OF TRADE
SECRET § 39 (1995) ("A trade secret is any information that can be used in the operation of a
business or other enterprise and that is sufficiently valuable and secret to afford an actual or
potential economic advantage over others." (emphasis added)).
57. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).
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use the same . .. "" Alternatively, for a trade secret to be protected, the
burden is on the owner of the confidential property to take reasonable
measures to conceal the property from the general public."
The second major distinction between patents and trade secrets is their
eligibility requirements.60 A trade secret may be any form of information-
both tangible and intangible-so long as it derives economic value to its
owner.6' Patents, however, must satisfy heightened, technical requirements
based upon their substantive, proprietary value.62 Congress established the
proprietary value requirements of patents in 35 U.S.C. § 101, which
mandates that a patent meet the requirements of (1) utility,63 (2) the proper
subject matter,' (3) novelty,6' and (4) non-obviousness.6 6 First, the patent
applicant can establish utility by demonstrating that the invention is useful
and new. 67 The standard for utility is not a difficult standard to satisfy and
only requires that the invention will provide some practical use that is not
illegal or "mischievous."66 To fit within the proper subject matter
requirements, a patent applicant must show that the object is a process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter."6  Under the novelty
requirement, a patent applicant must demonstrate that his invention is
merely something new and different from other, existing inventions.o To be
58. Id.
59. 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)(A) (2006) (stating that under the Economic Espionage Act, a
trade secret owner must take "reasonable measures" to ensure that the property has been
adequately concealed); cf RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION: DEFINITION OF
TRADE SECRET § 39 cmt. f. (1995) (stating that information, to qualify for trade secret
protection, must be kept secret by its owner to the extent it would be difficult or costly for
others to acquire it).
60. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-112 (2006) (setting forth the eligibility requirements for the
patentability of inventions).
61. See 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)(A) (2006); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION: DEFINITION OF TRADE SECRET § 39 cmt. e (1995).
62. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 112 (2006). The term "proprietary" is defined as "relating to, or
holding as property." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1339 (9th ed. 2011).
63. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
64. See id.
65. Id. § 102.
66. Id. § 103.
67. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966).
68. Bedford v. Hunt, 3 F. Cas. 37, 37 (Cir. Ct. Mass. 1817).
69. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
70. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006).
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non-obvious, a patent applicant must demonstrate that the invention is
more than a mere aggregation of old parts which perform or produce no
new or different function." In other words, the proposed use must have
some sort of an "inventive step" 72 that differentiates it from the obvious or
ordinary use of an invention currently used by the public.
The third major distinction between patents and trade secrets is the
duration of time each protection affords. When a patent is granted, the
patentee is given a monopoly over the rights of the patent for twenty years
from the date the patent application was filed.7 ' Additionally, under patent
protection, the patentee is given an absolute monopoly over the protected
rights of his property.6 When the patent term expires, however, the
patentee loses all rights to his invention, and the public is entitled to the
same use of the patented information that the patentee held for the duration
of the patent term.nAlternatively, the duration of a trade secret runs in
perpetuity until the owner reveals the protected secret.
In Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., the Supreme Court discussed the
distinction between trade secret protection and patent protection.7 ' The
Court divided the intellectual property into the categories of (1) clearly
unpatentable, (2) doubtfully patentable, and (3) clearly patentable."o The
Court reasoned that property that is clearly unpatentable or doubtfully
patentable is an excellent candidate for trade secret protection because it
may easily meet all of the requirements of a trade secret." As for property
71. Great Ad. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 152 (1950).
72. 37 C.F.R. § 1.484 (2008).
73. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006).
74. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006), with IP Handbook, supra note 20, at 282
exhibit 6-1 (noting the differences in the duration of time between patent and trade secret
protections).
75. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2).
76. IP Handbook, supra note 20, at 230.
77. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1).
78. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 496 (1974) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting). Trade secrets are more vulnerable to not having a guaranteed duration of
protection because "trade secret law . .. does not offer protection against discovery by fair
and honest means, such as by independent invention, accidental disclosure, or by so-called
reverse engineering." Id. at 476.
79. Id. at 489.
80. Id. at 484.
81. Id. at 484-90.
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that is clearly patentable, the Court noted that the owner of the property
retains the right to choose between trade secret and patent protection.82
As for property that is eligible for both patent and trade secret
protection, the owner's decision as to which protection to utilize will vary
based upon his purposes for the property." One such consideration is
whether the proprietary character of the protected property is easily reverse
engineered." If it is easily reverse engineered, then the trade secret owner is
better served by receiving a patent on the protected property because the
secret will be disclosed through honest means." Another consideration is
the likelihood that the property will be publicly sold and distributed or used
privately." For information that is to be used privately, trade secret
protection is a superior alternative to patent protection because no facts are
ever disclosed, and the secret remains with its owner in perpetuity. To
determine which protection to utilize, the owner must undertake a risk
analysis to determine which measure would best serve his products and
their needs." In regard to property that is clearly patentable, the Kewanee
Oil Court stated that "[w]here patent law acts as a barrier, trade secret law
functions relatively as a sieve.""
b. Copyright law
A copyright exists in original works of authorship that are fixed in any
tangible medium of expression." As with patents, there is an inherent
tension between copyrights and trade secrets because both may be used to
protect intellectual property.90 To be eligible for both a copyright and a
82. Id. at 491.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 490.
85. Id. at 476.
86. Id. at 483, 491.
87. 2 Louis ALTMAN & MALLA POLLACK, CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION,
TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES § 14.1: THEORIES OF PROTECTION (4th ed. 2006).
88. Kewanee Oil Co., 416 U.S. at 490. The Court noted that a patent holder is guaranteed
an absolute protection barrier that blocks a third party from independently developing and
using the same subject matter for a fixed duration of time. Trade secret protection, on the
other hand, does not provide a barrier from the independent development of a third party
and only provides protection so long as the patent holder meets his burden of keeping the
trade secret undisclosed to the general public. Id.; see also Alan Devlin, Restricting
Experimental Use, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 599, 628 (2009).
89. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006).
90. IP Handbook, supra note 20, at 284.
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trade secret, the owner of the property must affix the property within some
form of tangible expression; i.e., it must be capable of being seen or heard.9'
Copyright owners are granted the sole rights of reproducing, distributing,
displaying, and making derivative works or translations of the work, but
copyright protection does not block a third party from independently
developing and using the same subject matter.92
There are several differences and similarities between trade secrets and
copyrights. First, the term of a trade secret lasts in perpetuity, whereas a
copyright protects information for seventy years after the death of its
creator." Second, a copyright is created at the moment the idea is fixed into
a tangible medium of expression, whereas a trade secret is created at the
moment that its owner derives some economic value from it and has taken
the reasonable measures necessary to preserve the confidentiality of it.94
Third, like trade secrets, there are no proprietary character standards or
requirements for a copyright, and the owner is not required to register it.95
In certain circumstances, a copyright holder may register his copyright with
the United States Copyright Office, but this is not mandatory to enforce the
protection of the copyrighted material. 96 The decision of whether to seek
copyright protection or trade secret protection ultimately comes down to
the nature of the information and its principal use.97 In circumstances
where the owner wishes to keep information confidential and believes that
it is possible to do so, trade secret protection should be chosen over
copyright or patent protection."
91. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006).
92. Id. § 106.
93. Id. § 302.
94. Id. § 102.
95. Id. § 104(a).
96. See id. § 408(a); see also id. § 411 (explaining the registration benefits that are
procured through the registration process); id. § 501(b) (stating that the provisions for
infringement of a copyright are limited to parties who registered under § 411); id. § 505
(stating that the attorney's fees and costs are recoverable in any civil action). Although
copyright registration is not mandatory, it makes provision for the plaintiff to claim legal fees
and increased damage amounts. IP Handbook, supra note 20, at 192.
97. ALTMAN& POLLACK, supra note 87, § 14.14.
98. Id.
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3. Trade Secret Protection
Trade secrets are often the most undervalued asset that a corporation may
have." This is partly true because-unlike copyrights, trademarks, and
patents-trade secrets are not publicly filed; thus, they are often overlooked
and forgotten.o Without a public filing requirement, both state and federal
laws effectively allow intangible ideas to fall under the umbrella of trade secret
protection.' However difficult a trade secret may be to inventory and
ascertain, a corporation must nevertheless take the necessary measures to
protect trade secrets against unlawful dissemination. 02 The following
subsections provide the definitional elements of trade secrets, 0 the steps that
must be taken by a corporation to preserve a trade secret's confidential
status,1'o and what must be proved to enforce trade secret misappropriation.'
4. Criminal Liability-Economic Espionage Act of 1996
The main arm of criminal enforcement for the unlawful dissemination of
trade secrets is the EEA.'06 Congress explicitly stated that the primary
purpose of the EEA is not to punish employees who change employers or
start their own private business while using general knowledge and skills
developed while employed."0 ' Rather, Congress's intent was to criminalize a
former employee's use of knowledge about "specific products or processes"
that are unique to a company against that company-the former
employer.' Under the EEA, violators of trade secret dissemination may
face monetary penalties, jail time, probation, or some combination of these
forms of punishment.0 9
99. See IP Handbook, supra note 20, at 261; see also Palmer & Cay, Inc. v. Marsh &
McLennan Co., 404 F.3d 1297, 1301 n.8 (11th Cir. 2005).
100. See IP Handbook, supra note 20, at 261.
101. Id. at 262.
102. Id.
103. See infra Part II.A.6.a-c.
104. See infra Part II.A.6.b.
105. See infra Part II.A.7-8.
106. See IP Handbook, supra note 20, at 317.
107. H.R. REP. No. 104-788, at 7 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4021, 4026
[hereinafter Congressional Report].
108. Id.
109. Id. at 3-4.
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5. History of the EEA
On October 11, 1996, President Clinton signed the EEA into law." The
President stated that the purpose of the EEA was to "help us crack down on
acts like software piracy ... that cost American businesses billions of
dollars .... And it will advance our national security.""' The EEA is
governed by 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-1839 and provides two primary causes of
action."2 First, 18 U.S.C. § 1831(a) imposes criminal sanctions on an
individual who intentionally or knowingly disseminates a trade secret that is
to the benefit of a foreign power."' It was Congress's intent to leave
"benefit" to be interpreted broadly by the courts."' Congress expressly
stated that "'benefit' means not only an economic benefit but also a
reputational, strategic, or tactical benefit.""' Since the EEA's inception in
1996, there have been few convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 1831."6 Violation
of this section constitutes the crime of economic espionage under the
EEA."' Second, 18 U.S.C. § 1832 criminalizes domestic theft of trade secrets
"related to or included in a product that is produced for or placed in
interstate or foreign commerce.""'8 Under the EEA, any person convicted
110. Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, President on
Economic Espionage Act Signing (Oct. 11, 1996), 1996 WL 584924.
111. Id.
112. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-1839 (2006).
113. Economic Espionage Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1831(a) (2006) (stating that "[w]hoever,
intending or knowing that the offense will benefit any foreign
government. .. knowingly ... steals, or without authorization appropriates . .. a trade
secret... shall... be fined... or imprisoned... or both.").
114. Congressional Report, supra note 107, at 11.
115. Id.
116. See infra Part III.C (statistically noting the EEA's lack of use for prosecuting trade
secret theft).
117. 18 U.S.C. § 1831 (2006).
118. Economic Espionage Act: Theft Of Trade Secrets, 18 U.S.C. § 1832(a) (2006). This
statute states that
[w]hoever, with intent to convert a trade secret, that is related to or included in
a product that is produced for or placed in interstate ... commerce, to the
economic benefit of anyone other than the owner thereof, and intending or
knowing that the offense will, injure any owner of that trade secret,
knowingly-
(1) steals, or without authorization appropriates ... such information ....
shall... be fined ... or imprisoned ... or both.
Id.
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for any act of unlawful dissemination"'9 of a corporation's trade secrets will
face a monetary fine of up to $5,000,000, a prison sentence of up to ten
years for each violation he is convicted of, or both a prison sentence and a
fine. 20 A person convicted under this section of the EEA is convicted of the
crime of "Theft of Trade Secrets."' 2'
During the first five years of the EEA, either the Attorney General, the
Deputy Attorney General, or the Assistant Attorney General for the
Criminal Division of the Department of Justice were required to approve
any prosecution for violation of the EEA.122 The rationale behind this
approval requirement was to ensure that each case brought under the EEA
was not a purely civil matter.'23 Today, the Attorney General has dropped
the approval requirement for prosecutions under 18 U.S.C. § 1832, but has
kept the approval requirement in place for the foreign affairs provisions of
18 U.S.C. § 183 1.124
6. EEA Definition of a Trade Secret
The Uniform Trade Secret Act of 1985 provides the most widely used
definition of what comprises a trade secret under both the EEA and the
common law.125 Eighteen U.S.C. § 1839(3) provides both the definition of a
trade secret under the EEA and the necessary elements that must be proved
for a defendant to be convicted under the EEA.126 Congress derived the
term "trade secret" primarily from the definition used in the Uniform Trade
Secrets Act (UTSA).1 27 In 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3), Congress established that
119. See infra Part II.A.7-8 (defining "unlawful dissemination" and
explaining the EEA's treatment of it).
120. See 18 U.S.C. § 1832 (a)(5), (b) (2006).
121. Id. § 1832.
122. DAVID J. LOUNDY, COMPUTER CRIME, INFORMATION WARFARE, AND ECONOMIC
ESPIONAGE 543 (2003).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. See UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT WITH 1985 AMENDMENTS § 1(4) (1985).
126. See 18 U.S.C. § 1839 (2006).
127. See UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT WITH 1985 AMENDMENTS § 1 (1985) (stating that "a
'trade secret' means all forms and types of financial, business, scientific, technical, economic,
or engineering information"); see also Congressional Report, supra note 107, at 12. Congress
has established that a secret may only reach the status of a "trade secret" when the trade
secret derives independent, economic value through its confidentiality and that the owner
has taken reasonable steps to protect it. Id.
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(3) the term "trade secret" means all forms and types of financial,
business, scientific, technical, economic, or engineering
information, including patterns, plans, compilations, program
devices, formulas, designs, prototypes, methods, techniques,
processes, procedures, programs, or codes, whether tangible or
intangible, and whether or how stored, compiled, or
memorialized physically, electronically, graphically,
photographically, or in writing if -
(A) the owner thereof has taken reasonable measures to keep
such information secret; and
(B) the information derives independent economic value,
actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and
not being readily ascertainable through proper means by, the
public... .128
a. Information
Under the EEA, there are two broad categories of trade secrets that are
eligible for enforcement and protection.129 These two categories are defined
in 18 U.S.C. § 1839 as business information and technical information.130
First, business information is general information that is unique to the
owner and used within his business; some examples include customer lists,
financial information, or any confidential work product that is produced by
the business.' 1 Second, technical information is information that is
128. 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3) (2006) (emphasis added).
129. See id..
130. 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3) states, that a trade secret can be all "types of financial, business,
scientific, technical, economic, or engineering information, including patterns, plans,
compilations, program devices, formulas, designs, prototypes, methods, techniques,
processes, procedures, programs, or codes, whether tangible or intangible, and whether or
how stored, compiled, or memorialized physically, electronically, graphically,
photographically, or in writing...." Id.
131. See, e.g., Roton Barrier, Inc. v. Stanley Works, 79 F.3d 1112, 1117 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
(holding that market analysis information constitutes a trade secret); Duncan v. Steuzle, 76
F.3d 1480, 1488 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that marketing and strategy plans can constitute
trade secrets); SI Handling Sys., Inc. v. Heisley, 753 F.2d 1244, 1260 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding
that internal cost and pricing analysis information constitutes a trade secret); Am. Express
Fin. Advisors, Inc. v. Yantis, 358 F. Supp. 2d 818, 831 (N.D. Iowa 2005) (holding that
confidential information about a franchisor's clients and their financial histories and future
goals constitutes a trade secret); Frosty Bites, Inc. v. Dippin' Dots, No. 3-01-CV-1532-M,
2003 WL 21196247, at *9 (N.D. Tex. May 19, 2003) (holding that manuals relating to the
operation of a business franchise constitute a trade secret); Ready Link Healthcare v. Cotton,
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completely unique to the company that owns it; some examples include
blueprints to a machine, a secret recipe, computer software codes,
engineering notebooks, or the knowledge of a process that a company uses
in its manufacturing.'32 This information is typically derived from intensive
labor and investment into the particular field in which the corporation is
engaged.
b. Reasonable measures to keep such information secret
To qualify for a trade secret, the trade secret owner must take protective
steps to ensure that his trade secret is kept out of the hands of others.133
Under the EEA, these measures of protection must meet the standard of
reasonableness.134 The owner's mere desire to keep information secret is not
enough to meet the reasonable protection standard."' Additionally,
industry competitors, the public, or others who could utilize the economic
value from its disclosure must not generally know the information.'36 The
UTSA states, "If the principal persons who can obtain economic benefit
from information are aware of it, there is no trade secret.""' Reasonable
measures to maintain secrecy have been held to include "advising
employees of the existence of a trade secret, limiting access to a trade secret
24 Cal. Rptr. 3d 720, 729 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that confidential personnel
information such as names of employees, compensation plans for employees, and other
miscellaneous employee information constitutes a trade secret).
132. See, e.g., Uncle B's Bakery, Inc. v. O'Rourke, 920 F. Supp 1405, 1429 (N.D. Iowa
1996) (holding that confidential information concerning secret recipes, production planning,
and packaging processes constitutes a trade secret); Harbor Software, Inc. v. Applied Sys.,
Inc., 887 F. Supp. 86, 90 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding that the overall design process and actual
design of a software program constitute a trade secret); Integrated Cash Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v.
Digital Transactions, Inc., 732 F. Supp. 370, 376 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (holding that negative
information, i.e., failed designs and processes that were learned through trial and error,
constitutes a trade secret); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 107 F.R.D. 288, 289 (D.
Del. 1985) (noting that "[tihe complete formula for Coca-Cola is one of the best-kept trade
secrets in the world"); Olson v. Nieman's, Ltd., 579 N.W.2d 299, 314 (Iowa 1998) (holding
that plans, designs, patterns, and specifications and configurations for specialized equipment
to be used in a franchised operation constitute trade secrets).
133. See 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)(A) (2006).
134. Id.
135. IP Handbook, supra note 20, at 275.
136. Id. at 273.
137. UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT WITH 1985 AMENDMENTS § 1 cmt. at 7 (1985).
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on a 'need to know basis,' requiring employees to sign confidentiality
agreements, and keeping secret documents under lock.""'
A trade secret may be communicated to a select group of people while
still maintaining its status as a trade secret.' This is permissible when the
secrets are communicated to others within the company or an independent
contractor so long as the parties involved agree to safeguard the
information by virtue of a confidentiality agreement.' Currently, no set
objective standard exists for the courts to follow to determine whether a
corporation's measures of protection rise to the level of reasonableness. 4 ' In
each case, the courts look to the nature of the trade secret and to the
controls that have been established to protect its dissemination. 142In
Religious Technology Center v. Netcom,"' the District Court for the
Northern District of California established that in certain circumstances,
the reasonableness standard may require a trade secret owner to employ a
combination of protective measures to maintain the status of a trade
secret.'" In addition to any combination of protection employed, courts
today have consistently held that some form of a confidentiality agreement
is required to ensure that all parties are aware of the confidentiality of the
protected information.14 5
c. Derives economic value from not being publicly known
Not only must the information be kept secret, but the secrecy of the trade
secret must cause it to be valuable.'" This value is analyzed in terms of
speculating what the monetary value of the trade secret is or would be to
both the trade secret owner and his competitors.'4 1 In Learning Curve Toys
138. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc'n Servs., Inc., 923 F. Supp. 1231,
1253 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (citations omitted).
139. IP Handbook, supra note 20, at 271.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 275.
142. Id. at 275-76.
143. Religious Tech. Ctr., 923 F. Supp. at 1253.
144. Id.
145. See Cinebase Software, Inc. v. Media Guar. Trust, Inc., No. C98-1100 FMS, 1998
WL 661465, at *10 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (holding that a confidentiality agreement may be
required to maintain trade secret status).
146. 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)(b) (2006).
147. Learning Curve Toys, Inc. v. Playwood Toys, Inc., 342 F.3d 714, 726 (7th Cir. 2003).
The pertinent trade secrets were the methods that were employed in the production of a
certain toy train track. Id. at 725. The trade secret made it possible for a toy train to travel
104 [Vol. 7:87
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v. Playwood Toys," the Seventh Circuit analyzed the economic value
component by comparing the sales figures of a toy train track before and
after a trade secret was implemented in the manufacturing process of the
train track.' 9 The court noted that the sales for the track skyrocketed after
the trade secret was implemented and that the sales increase was satisfactory
and articulable evidence of the economic value of the toy company's trade
secret.so
Model jury instructions help define this concept further by explaining
that "[i]ndependent economic value .. .means financial worth which, when
compared to other methods or processes publicly known to those in the
same or similar businesses or scientific community, give the holder of
method or processes a competitive advantage over others."'' The Supreme
Court discussed trade secrets in Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.'52 and
emphasized that "the value of a trade secret lies in the competitive
advantage it gives its owner over competitors."'" Apparent from this
definition, trade secret law is a means of monetizing the research and
development efforts of companies, where the owners do not wish to patent
or copyright their discoveries.'
7. Misappropriation Under the EEA
Under the EEA, a prosecutor may charge a defendant for actual
misappropriation or conversion of a trade secret, conspiracy to
misappropriate a trade secret, or an attempt to misappropriate a trade
secret."' The act includes two statutes under which a defendant may be
tried and convicted-one that specifically focuses on misappropriation to
foreign governments, and the other, which generally focuses upon theft of
trade secrets by a foreign or domestic defendant.' 6 Although each of these
uninhibited on a toy train track, but, due to a special manufacturing process, the train track
emitted a sound as the toy train passed by. Id. at 718.
148. 342 F.3d 714.
149. Id. at 718, 720.
150. Id. at 718.
151. Michelle L. Evans, Establishing Liability for Misappropriation of Trade Secrets: § 31
Independent Economic Value, in 91 AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE PROOF OF FACTS 95 (3d ed.,
2012) (emphasis added).
152. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
153. Id. at 1011 n.15.
154. IP Handbook, supra note 20, at 270.
155. 18 U.S.C. § 1831-1832. (2006).
156. See id. §§ 1831(a), 1832(a).
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sections differs in regard to the scope of the EEA, they essentially possess
the same elements that need to be proved to convict a defendant.' The
only minor differences between the two statutes are the mens rea
requirements in subparts (a) in each
secret":
18 U.S.C. § 1831-Economic
Espionage
(a) In general.-Whoever,
intending or knowing that the
offense will benefit any foreign
government, foreign
instrumentality, or foreign agent,
knowingly-
(1) steals ... obtains a trade
secret;
(2) without authorization
copies . .. a trade secret;
(3) receives, buys, or possesses a
trade secret. .. . .
section, and scope of the term "trade
18 U.S.C. § 1832-Theft of Trade
Secrets
(a) Whoever, with intent to convert a
trade secret, that is related to or
included in a product that is
produced for or placed in interstate
or foreign commerce, to the economic
benefit of anyone other than the owner
thereof and intending or knowing
that the offense will, injure any owner
of that trade secret, knowingly-
(1) steals ... such information;
(2) without authorization
copies . .. such information;
(3) receives, buys, or posses such
information. . .. 5
The primary difference between the mens rea elements under each
statute is that under § 1831, the mens rea element is singular, and under
§ 1832 there is a dual mens rea requirement. Under § 1831, the only mens
rea element that must be proved is that the actor acted "intending or
knowing that the offense will benefit any foreign government . 1.6. " In
§ 1832, the actor must act "with [1] intent to convert a trade secret ... to the
economic benefit of anyone other that the owner thereof, and [2] intending
or knowing that the offense will, injure any owner of that trade
secret ... ."161 Also, the mens rea modifier "knowingly" is the last word used
157. Id.
158. Id. § 1831(a)(1)-(3) (emphasis added).
159. Id. § 1832(a)(1)-(3) (emphasis added).
160. 18 U.S.C. § 1831(a) (2006) (emphasis added).
161. Id. § 1832(a) (emphasis added).
106 [Vol. 7:87
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in subsection (a) of both sections 1831 and 1832.162 This word attaches the
mens rea elements to the actus reus elements contained in subparts (1)-(3)
under both sections 1831(a) and 1832(a).163 Under these subparts, the act
criminalizes the theft, misappropriation, unauthorized copying-and most
notably-the knowing receipt, purchase, or possession of the trade secret
information that was either stolen, appropriated, or received without the
authorization of its owner.'"
8. Proving Misappropriation under the EEA: United States v. Hanjuan
inl65 as a Framework for Analyzing Misappropriation.
There has only been one conviction under § 1831, but there have been
many under § 1832 of the EEA.'" In United States v. Hanjuan Jin, Jin was
accused of violating both sections 1831 and 1832 of the EEA."' At her trial,
Jin was found not guilty of violating the economic espionage provision
found in § 1831(a)(3), but she was convicted for the theft of trade secrets
provision under § 1832(a)(3).' 68 The court provided a detailed analysis that
sets forth an excellent framework for proving misappropriation under the
EEA.
The defendant, Jin, was an employee of Motorola, Inc. and worked and
resided in Illinois.' 9 She worked for Motorola for seven years before taking
a yearlong sabbatical, during which time she obtained concurrent
employment with Sun Kaisens, a technology company that, inter alia,
developed communications equipment for the Chinese military.'70 After her
sabbatical, Jin returned to work for Motorola for two days before
resigning.'' During these two days, Jin downloaded over 5,000 of
Motorola's confidential proprietary files onto an external hard disk and
filled two large shopping bags with Motorola documents containing
162. Id. §§ 1831(a), 1832(a).
163. Id.
164. Id. §§ 1831(a)(1)-(3), 1832(a)(1)-(3).
165. United States v. Hanjuan Jin, 833 F. Supp. 2d 977 (N.D. Ill. 2012).
166. See United States v. Chung, 659 F.3d 815 (9th Cir. 2011) (convicting defendant
under the economic espionage provision of the EEA).
167. Jin, 833 F. Supp. 2d at 1015.
168. Id. at 1018.
169. Id. at 980-81.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 983-85.
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confidential information.'72 The information she obtained from the
computer files and physical documents related to three of Motorola's
research and development projects for its iDen cellular technology."' Jin
then resigned from her job, emptied her bank accounts, and prepared to fly
to China via O'Hare International Airport in Chicago. 7 1 While passing
through customs, Jin raised the suspicion of the gate agent because she
falsely reported the amount of currency she was carrying into China; she
also could not sufficiently explain why she was in possession of all of the
Motorola equipment and files that were visibly labeled as "confidential and
proprietary information.""' The agents also discovered a military
technology manual for Sun Kaisens.176 This manual indicated that Sun
Kaisens was a provider of communications technology for the Chinese
military.'77 Jin was later placed under arrest and tried under the economic
espionage and theft of trade secret provisions of the EEA."'
a. Element one: Does the information constitute a trade secret?
To be convicted under the EEA, a defendant must misappropriate
information that meets the requirements necessary to constitute a trade
secret."' Under the EEA, information constitutes a trade secret if (1) the
information is not known or readily ascertainable by the general public, (2)
the owner of the information took reasonable measures to ensure its
secrecy, and (3) the information derives economic value based upon its
secrecy.'80
(1) Was the information known or readily ascertainable by the
public?
The Jin court found that both the electronic files and the physical
documents containing the secret information did effectively constitute a
172. Id. at 984-85.
173. Id. at 986.
174. Id. at 986-87.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 988.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 980.
179. See infra Part II.A.6 (defining all of the essential definitional components of a trade
secret under the EEA).
180. 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3) (2006).
108 [Vol. 7:87
ABUSE OF THE JOURNALIST'S SHIELD
trade secret.' This information met the definitional elements of a trade
secret because the information was "not known or readily ascertainable to
the public."'82 Under EEA jurisprudence, the circuits are split as to what
constitutes the term "public."' The Third Circuit contends that the term
"public" in sections 1831 and 1832 is implicitly preceded by the word
"general," meaning that the secret must not be known by the "general
public" at large.'" The competing view, which is held by the Seventh
Circuit, contends that the term "public" is implicitly preceded by the word
"educated" or "economically important."' Under this interpretation, the
group of people embodied by the term "public" only includes those who are
familiar with and engaged in the business within the pertinent field."' In
Jin, the court held that the information in question met the "not generally
known by the public" requirement because the information was not known
by either interpretation of "public." "
(2) Did the business entity take reasonable measures to keep the
information secret?
Second, courts will look to whether the trade secret owner took
reasonable measures to keep the information secret.' In Jin, the court
found that Motorola did take reasonable measures to keep its proprietary
information confidential.' When determining whether an owner of a trade
secret took reasonable security measures to ensure protection of his trade
secrets, courts balance the costs of a given precautionary measure with the
benefits that are obtained by way of the precautionary measures. 90 This
analysis is fact sensitive and each result will turn on the nature of the
information, the identity of the misappropriator, and the protective
measures that are employed. 9 ' In Jin, Motorola's precautionary measures
included, inter alia, monitoring the computer network for download
181. Jin, 833 F. Supp. 2d at 1011.
182. Id. at 1007 (quoting the EEA, § 1839(3)).
183. Id.
184. United States v. Hsu, 155 F.3d 189, 196 (3d Cir. 1998).
185. United States v. Lange, 312 F.3d 263, 266-67 (7th Cir. 2002).
186. Id.
187. Jin, 833 F. Supp. 2d at 1007.
188. See supra Part II.A.6.b.
189. in, 833 F. Supp. 2d at 1009.
190. See Rockwell Graphic Sys. v. DEV Indus., 925 F.2d 174, 179 (7th Cir. 1991).
191. Id.
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anomalies; monitoring network alarms; installing network firewalls,
physical security cameras, individual access cards, and passcodes;
implementing detailed security initiatives for the proper handling of
classified materials; training regarding the confidentiality required of
employees; and also training regarding mandatory adherence to the terms
of signed confidentiality agreements.'92 The confidentiality agreements
detailed all specific classification levels and their concomitant requirements
for handling Motorola's classified information.'93 Under the EEA, while a
company does not need to take "every conceivable step to protect the
property from misappropriation,"' the Jin court described Motorola's
"multi-pronged approach" as a reasonable means of maintaining the secrecy
of Motorola's trade secrets. 9s
(3) Does the information derive independent economic value
from its secrecy?
Third, courts will analyze alleged trade secret information to ascertain
whether the information derives any economic value as a result of its
secrecy.'96 In Jin, the court held that the information that was removed from
Motorola derived independent economic value from the fact that it was
unknown to others.'97 In United States v. Chung'"-representing one of the
first convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 1831-the Ninth Circuit developed this
element by analyzing "the degree to which the secret information confers a
competitive advantage on its owner."'99 Jin made the argument that, due to
the fact that she had the personal knowledge of all of the information that
she was removing from the United States, she did not face liability under
the EEA.200 In essence, she asserted that she did not even need the
192. Jin, 833 F. Supp. 2d at 1008-09.
193. Id. at 1009.
194. Congressional Report, supra note 107, at 7.
195. Jin, 833 F. Supp. 2d at 1008-09.
196. See supra Part II.A.6.c (explaining the economic value requirement of a trade secret
under the EEA).
197. Jin, 833 F. Supp. 2d at 1010.
198. United States v. Chung, 659 F.3d 815, 826-27 (9th Cir. 2011).
199. Id. The court stated that "[a] reasonable inference is that the information could
assist a competitor in understanding how [the trade secret owner] approaches problem-
solving and in figuring out how best to bid on a similar project in the future." Id. at 827.
200. Jin, 833 F. Supp. 2d at 1010.
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information because the information was already in her mind.201 Her
argument had some merit, as Congress noted in the Congressional Report,
because the EEA does not apply to "individuals who seek to capitalize on
the personal knowledge, skill, or abilities they may have developed" from
their previous employment.202 The court emphasized that Jin's argument
failed because she physically removed confidential information about
Motorola's products and processes from the Motorola property.203 The fact
that she physically removed thousands of computer files from the property
served as direct evidence that Jin needed the information contained in the
Motorola property; thus, Jin did not have the personal knowledge she
claimed to have.204 The court held that because the information in Jin's
possession could be of potential economic value to the recipient, that
information derived an economic benefit from being kept secret.205
b. Element two: Did the accused possess the knowledge that the
information was a trade secret?
Under both sections 1831(a)(3) and 1832(a)(3), the government must
prove that the defendant knowingly "receives, buys, or possesses a [trade
secret], knowing the same to have been stolen or appropriated, obtained, or
converted without authorization." 206 The Jin court found that Jin satisfied
the mens rea element of having the requisite knowledge that she possessed
trade secrets at the time she misappropriated them.207 When looking to the
statutory language of sections 1831(a)(1)-(3) and 1832(a)(1)-(3), the word
"knowingly"-the last word in section (a)-modifies not only the transitive
verbs at the beginning of subparts (1)-(3), but "knowingly" also modifies
the object of the transitive verbs.208 Thus, the government has the burden of
201. Id.
202. Congressional Report, supra note 107, at 7.
203. in, 833 F. Supp. 2d at 1010-11.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 1010.
206. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831(a) and 1832(a)(3) replace the words "trade secret" with "such
information." See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831(a)(3), 1832(a)(3) (2006).
207. in, 833 F. Supp. 2d at 1015.
208. See id. at 1012; see also Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 556 U.S. 646 (2009). When
looking at a statute that was constructed similarly to 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831(a)(1)-(3) and
1832(a)(1)-(3), the Supreme Court definitively held that the mens rea "knowingly"
requirement extends to both the transitive verbs and their objects in a statute. Id. at 650. The
Court stated
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not only proving (as evidenced by the transitive verb) that the defendant
completed the bad act, but also that the defendant knew that the
information was a trade secret.209 For example, in § 1832(a)(1), it must not
only be proved that the defendant knowingly converted information but it
also must be proved that the defendant knowingly converted information
while having actual knowledge of the fact that it was a trade secret.210
The next question, then, is whether a defendant must have the
knowledge that the information is a trade secret to the extent of the
statutory definition stated in 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3), or if it is enough for the
government to prove that the defendant merely knew that he possessed
confidential "proprietary information."21 ' Currently, the circuits are split in
making this determination. In United States v. Krumrei,2 12 the Sixth Circuit
concluded that it is not necessary to prove that a defendant had actual
knowledge of the fact that the stolen information was a trade secret under
18 U.S.C. § 1839(3).213 To make this determination, the Krumrei court
queried the extent of the defendant's knowledge-not of the secret
information-but of the protective measures that were put in place by the
trade secret owner."' With this in mind, the court reasoned that it is not
necessary for the accused to have had knowledge of the specific security
measures that were employed to protect the stolen confidential
information.2 15 The Krumrei court held that the defendant only had to
know that the information was "proprietary."2 16 In United States v.
Roberts, 21 7 the District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee defined
[a] s a matter of ordinary English grammar, it seems natural to read the statute's
word "knowingly" as applying to all the subsequently listed elements of the
crime . . . . Where a transitive verb has an object, listeners in most contexts
assume that an adverb (such as knowingly) that modifies the transitive verb
tells the listener how the subject performed the entire action, including the
object.
Id. (emphasis added).
209. Jin, 833 F. Supp. 2d at 1012.
210. See id. at 1013-14.
211. See id. at 1012-13.
212. United States v. Krumrei, 258 F.3d 535 (6th Cir. 2001).
213. See id. at 539.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. United States v. Roberts, No. 3:08-CR-175, 2009 WL 5449224, at *5 (E.D. Tenn.
Nov. 7,2009).
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"proprietary" as "belonging to someone else who has an exclusive right to it,
but does not have to know that it meets the statutory definition of a trade
secret." 218
On the other side of the split, in United States v. Nosal, 219 the District
Court for the Northern District of California required the prosecution to
prove more than that the information was merely proprietary.2 0 In NOsal,
the court required it to be proved that the defendant possessed the
knowledge that the information did indeed constitute a "trade secret"
according to the definitional elements of 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3).221 This
knowledge was required at the time the accused committed the
appropriation.222 The court stated that the government must prove that the
defendant knew the information in question possessed more than the
"general" attributes of a trade secret to violate § 1831 or § 1832.223
In dismissing the circuit split, the Jin court contended that this split is
fictitious. 224 The court reasoned that both sides arrive at the same
conclusion following either path of the circuit split.225 When making this
determination, the Jin court noted that if a defendant possessed actual
knowledge of the information's "proprietary" nature, this knowledge
establishes that he "had the general attributes of a trade secret in order to
establish a violation ... of the EEA."2 2 6
c. Element three: Proving the unique mens rea requirements
under Sections 1831(a) and 1832(a).
The next steps that must be taken when prosecuting an individual or
corporation under the EEA is to prove the mens rea elements that are
unique to either section 1831(a) or 1832(a). To be convicted under the
economic espionage component of the EEA-§ 1831-the accused must
intend or know that the theft of the trade secrets will benefit any foreign
218. Id. at *5.
219. United States v. Nosal, No. CR 08-00237, 2009 WL 981336 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2011),
rev'd, 642 F.3d 781 (9th Cir. 2011), reh'g en banc granted, 661 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2011), affd,
676 F.3d 854 (9th Cir. 2012).
220. Nosal, 2009 WL 981336, at *3.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. See United States v. Hanjuan Jin, 833 F. Supp. 2d 977, 1012-13 (N.D. Ill. 2012).
225. See id. at 1011-13.
226. Id. at 1013-14.
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government.227 Under the theft of trade secrets provision of the EEA-
§ 1832-the prosecution must prove that the accused possessed (1) an
intent to convert the trade secret information to the benefit of anyone other
than the owner, and (2) that the accused possessed an intent to or
knowledge that the misappropriation will injure any owner of the trade
secret.228
(1) Economic espionage under Section 1831: Intent to benefit
any foreign government.
Under § 1831(a), the government must prove two interrelated parts of
this element. The first element is self-explanatory-the government must
prove that the intended beneficiary is a "foreign government." 2 9 Second,
the government must prove that the accused had knowledge that his
conduct would benefit the foreign government to which the information
was given.230 While § 1832 limits the term "benefit" to only economic
benefits, "'benefit' [as used in section 1831] is intended to be interpreted
broadly."231 Here, under § 1831, it is sufficient if the accused disseminated
the trade secret information to the benefit of a foreign government "in any
way," not merely to the economic benefit of a foreign government.232
In Jin, the court concluded that Jin did not violate § 1831 because the
link between her actions and the concomitant benefit to the Chinese
government was far too attenuated.233 The court based its conclusion on the
prosecution's failure to adequately prove that the Chinese government
would find the technological information beneficial. 23 4 The court pointed
out that the same evidence the government relied upon to show that Jin
developed technology for the Chinese military also contained information
showing that the Chinese already possessed technology far superior than
that which Jin misappropriated. 2 3 5 Thus, because the prosecution failed to
show why the Chinese government would want to use technology that is
227. See 18 U.S.C. § 1831(a) (2006).
228. Id. § 1832(a).
229. Id. § 1831(a).
230. Id.
231. Congressional Report, supra note 107, at 11.
232. Id. Congress stated that "in this circumstance, benefit means not only an economic
benefit but also reputational, strategic, or tactical benefit." Id.
233. United States v. Hanjuan Jin, 833 F. Supp. 2d 977, 1019-20 (N.D. Ill. 2012).
234. Id. at 1020.
235. Id.
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inferior to what it was currently using, the prosecution failed to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that Jin violated § 183 1.236
(2) Theft of trade secrets under § 1832: Intent to benefit the
recipient, and intent to injure the owner of the trade secret.
Under § 1832, the mere possession of trade secrets is not a crime.237 To
establish a criminal offense under § 1832, the prosecution must first prove
that the accused possessed trade secrets with the intent to misappropriate
them for a personal benefit, or to the benefit of a third party.238 Under this
element, defendants often raise the argument that this portion of the statute
focuses on the question of whether the trade secret was, or potentially could
be, of value to its recipient.239 If the information is of no value to its
recipient, the accused did not violate this element. 240 As a result, the primary
inquiry of the statute is to ascertain the intent of the accused at the time the
offense was committed.241 Thus, the only time a court will inquire into
whether the trade secrets contained actual value in the mind of the end user
is when that end user is the rogue employee who converted the trade
secrets.242
With regard to personal benefit, the Jin court held that, at a minimum,
the trade secret information that a person uses to obtain and prepare for
future employment is a sufficient benefit under § 1832(a). 243 The court
noted that there was no need for the prosecution to prove that Sun Kaisens
(the intended recipient of Jin's information) had requested the information
because the key focus is on the intent of the accused at the time that the
trade secrets were taken.2" When looking at Jin's intent at the time that she
removed the trade secrets, her intent was to either give the information to
236. Id.
237. IP Handbook, supra note 20, at 289.
238. See United States v. Hsu, 155 F.3d 189, 195 (3d Cir. 1998); see also 18 U.S.C.
§ 1832(a) (2006).
239. Hsu, 155 F.3d at 196. The Hsu court stated that "prosecutions under § 1832 uniquely
require that the defendant intend to confer an economic benefit on the defendant or another
person or entity." Id.
240. See id.
241. Jin, 833 F. Supp. 2d at 1016; Hsu, 155 F.3d at 196.
242. Jin, 833 F. Supp. 2d at 1016.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 1017.
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Sun Kaisens or to use the information to prepare for new employment.245
The fact that the trade secrets that Jin possessed were of little utility to Sun
Kaisens was irrelevant to the court because Jin's intent at the time of their
conversion was to use them for her own personal benefit of obtaining
further employment, for the benefit of Sun Kaisens, or for both.24 6
Second, a defendant found guilty under § 1832 must have intended or
known that his conduct would harm the owner of the trade secret.247
Congress stated that this requires that the accused "knew or was aware to a
practical certainty" that the conduct of converting the trade secrets would
cause injury to the owner of the trade secrets.248 In United States v.
Aleynikov, 249 the District Court for the Southern District of New York held
that the use of trade secret information to directly compete against the true
owner of the information is sufficient to establish that the defendant used
the information with the intent to injure the owner.25 o
The confidential character and nature of the business is another factor
that courts look to under the intent to injure requirement.251 Under this
rationale, it is not necessary for stolen information to make it into the hands
of a competitor.252 In Aleynikov, the court relied heavily on the fact that the
trade secret owner, Goldman Sachs, thrived on the secretive nature of its
high frequency trading business.2 ' In other words, because the core of the
business was founded upon confidentiality and secrecy, the disclosure of
that information is presumed to cause injury.254 To prove this element, the
government does not need to show that there is a willing market for the
purchase or use of the misappropriated information, but the government
must show that the defendant knew that the owner desired to keep it secure
and that the defendant at least intended to make the stolen information
available for use.255 Also, when a company's trade secrets are breached, the
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. 18 U.S.C. § 1832(a) (2006).
248. in, 833 F. Supp. 2d at 1018.
249. United States v. Aleynikov, 785 F. Supp. 2d 46, 59 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
250. Id. at 59.
251. Id.
252. in, 833 F. Supp. 2d at 1018.
253. Aleynikov, 785 F. Supp. 2d at 59.
254. Id.
255. Id.
116 [Vol. 7:87
ABUSE OF THE JOURNALIST'S SHIELD
money, time, and resources that a company expends on damage control is
sufficient evidence to prove the intent to injure the owner. 56
d. Actus reus requirements under Sections 1831 and 1832 of the
EEA
The determination that a defendant violated one of the prohibited acts in
sections 1831(a)(1)-(3) or 1832(a)(1)-(3) is not nearly as difficult to prove
as the scienter elements because the EEA plainly describes the actus reus
requirements under each section.257 In n, Jin's actions satisfied the actus
reus elements of sections 1831(a)(3) and 1832(a)(3).2 ss The facts that she
downloaded thousands of documents that were outside of the scope of her
Motorola responsibilities, that she continued to download files after her
resignation, that she lied to the FBI agents at O'Hare International Airport,
and the plethora of other incriminating evidence all were used as evidence
to prove that Jin knowingly violated the actus reus elements of § 1832.259
9. State Survey of Civil Liability for Trade Secret Misappropriation
Even though copyrights, trademarks, and patents are uniformly enforced
under federal law, trade secret law is subject to the laws of fifty-one different
jurisdictions. Within the fifty states and the District of Columbia, each
state's laws are either (1) partially based on the Uniform Trade Secrets Act,
(2) completely based on the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, or (3) are based
upon the common law approach evidenced by the Restatement of Unfair
Competition.260 As evidenced by the name of the committee-the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws-the drafters of the
UTSA intended to establish uniform state laws for the protection of trade
secrets.26' Despite the intent of the UTSA, each state's trade secret laws
differ widely. Currently, thirty-seven states262 use differing versions of the
256. See ]in, 833 F. Supp. 2d at 1018.
257. 18 U.S.C. § 1831(a)(1)-(3), 1832(a)(1)-(3) (2006).
258. fin, 833 F. Supp. 2d at 1015.
259. Id.
260. See UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT WITH 1985 AMENDMENTS §§ 1-12 (1985);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 39-45 (1995).
261. See UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT WITH 1985 AMENDMENTS: PREFATORY NOTE (1985).
262. Currently, the following 37 states use a modified version of the UTSA (note: each
statute cited is the first substantive statute in the series of each state's trade secret laws):
Alabama (ALA. CODE § 8-27-2 (1987)); Alaska (ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.940 (1988)); Arizona
(ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-401 (1990)); Arkansas (ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-75-601 (1981));
California (CAL. ClV. CODE § 3426 (West 1984)); Colorado (COLO. REv. STAT. § 7-74-101
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UTSA for their trade secret laws. Nine states and the District of Columbia26 3
use the UTSA in its entirety. The remaining five states strictly adhere to the
Restatement approach.26
10. Remedies for Trade Secret Misappropriation
a. Equitable remedies
The most common remedies for misappropriation of trade secrets are
equitable remedies.265 In trade secret litigation, the equitable remedies of
injunctions, royalty order injunctions, mandatory injunctions, and
protective orders are the most common remedies provided.266 Both the
UTSA and the Restatement of Unfair Competition recommend equitable
(1986)); Connecticut (CONN. GEN. STAT. § 35-50 (1983)); Georgia (GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-760
(1990)); Hawaii (HAW. REV. STAT. § 482B-2 (1989)); Idaho (IDAHO CODE ANN. § 48-801
(1990)); Illinois (765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 1065/2 (1988)); Indiana (IND. CODE § 24-2-3-1 (1982));
Iowa (IOWA CODE § 550.1 (1990)); Kentucky (Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 365.880 (West 1990));
Louisiana (LA. REv. STAT ANN. § 51:1431 (1981)); Maine (ME. REv. STAT. tit. 10, § 1542
(1987)); Maryland (MD. CODE ANN. COM. LAW § 11-1201 (West 2010)); Michigan (MICH.
COMP. LAWS § 445.1902 (1998)); Minnesota (MINN. STAT. § 325C.01 (1986)); Mississippi
(MIss. CODE ANN. § 75-26-3 (1990)); Missouri (Mo. REV. STAT. § 417.453 (1995)); Montana
(MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-402 (1985)); Nebraska (NEB. REV. STAT. § 87-501 (1988)); Nevada
(NEV. REv. STAT. § 600A.010 (1987)); New Mexico (N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-3A-1 (1989));
North Dakota (N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-25.1-01 (1993)); Ohio (OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1333.61 (West 1994)); Oregon (OR. REV. STAT. § 646.461 (1987)); Pennsylvania (12 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5301 (West 2004)); South Carolina (S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-8-20,(1997));
South Dakota (S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 37-29-1 (1994)); Tennessee (TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-
1701 (2000)); Vermont (VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4601 (1995)); Virginia (VA. CODE ANN.
§ 59.1-336 (2009)); Washington (WASH. REV. CODE § 19.108.010 (1981)); Wisconsin (WIs.
STAT. § 134.90 (2011)); and Wyoming (WYo. STAT. ANN. § 40-24-101 (2006)).
263. Currently, the following nine states and the District of Columbia base their trade
secret laws entirely on the UTSA (note: each statute cited is the first substantive statute in the
series of each state's trade secret laws): Delaware (DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2001 (2002));
District of Columbia (D.C. CODE § 36-401 ((1989)); Florida (FLA. STAT. § 688.001 (1988));
Kansas (KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3320 (1981)); New Hampshire (N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 350-
B:1 (2011)); Oklahoma (OKLA. STAT. tit 78, § 86 (1986)); Rhode Island (R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-
41-1 (1986)); Utah (UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-24-1 (West 1989)); and West Virginia (W. VA.
CODE § 47-22-1 (1986)).
264. Currently, the following five states base their trade secret laws on the common law
Restatement approach: Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, and Texas.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 39-45 (1995).
265. See IP Handbook, supra note 20, at 307.
266. See id. at 307, 310-12.
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remedies as the primary means of redress when a court finds that trade
secrets have been misappropriated.267
b. Economic damages
When choosing between damage calculation options, "the proper
measure of damages in a trade secret misappropriation case . . . has been
that which affords the plaintiff the greatest recovery."268 As a result, there
are six common methods of damage calculations that courts commonly use
to determine appropriate damage measures when equitable remedies are
inappropriate.269
(1) Actual value measure
The first measure concerns the actual value of the trade secret.270 Under
this consideration, either the actual value or the diminution in value27 1 of
the trade secret may be considered in the damage calculations. 27 2 Courts
approach this calculation by analyzing the costs that a company may incur
"in acquiring the same information or trade secret through its own
experimentation or through other lawful means."273 In the event that a
competitor destroys the trade secret, the actual value price calculation will
be equal to the value of the trade secret to the plaintiff at the time that the
trade secret was destroyed.274 If the trade secret is not destroyed, the courts
267. See UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT WITH 1985 AMENDMENTS § 2 (1985); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 44 (1995).
268. Michael Rosenhouse, Annotation, Proper Measure & Elements of Damages for
Misappropriation of Trade Secret, 11 A.L.R. 4th 21 (1982).
269. Robin C. Sickles & Ashok Ayyar, Evaluation of Damages Claims in a Trade Secrets
Case, in ECONOMIC DAMAGES IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: A HANDS-ON GUIDE TO LITIGATION
265, 267 (Daniel Slottje ed., 2006).
270. Id. at 267.
271. The diminution in value method is "a way of calculating damages for breach of
contract based on a reduction in market value . . . ." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 524 (9th ed.
2009).
272. Id.
273. See, e.g., McRoberts Software, Inc. v. Media 100, Inc., 329 F.3d 557, 570 (7th Cir.
2003).
274. Trade secrets are destroyed when a competitor misappropriates the trade secret in
such a way that it is impossible for it to remain unique and secretive to its original owner. See
Medtronic Vascular, Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., Civ.98-80-SLR, 2005 WL
388592, at *1 n.4 (D. Del. Feb. 2, 2005).
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calculate the damages according to the diminution in value of the trade
secret.275
(2) Lost profits measure
Second, courts will also evaluate the amount of profits lost by a plaintiff
as a result of misappropriation.276 Lost profits are calculated by subtracting
the production costs from the loss of revenues due to loss of sales. 27 7 Courts
may also make additions or deductions to the lost profit value by analysis of
market conditions, inflation, or other economic factors that may influence
the lost profit value.278
(3) Unjust enrichment measure
Courts also may use an unjust enrichment analysis as the third measure
to calculate damages for trade secret misappropriation.2 79 Courts calculate
unjust enrichment by considering the value of the trade secret at the time
that it was misappropriated and also considering (1) the amount the
plaintiff may receive by the disgorgement of the profits,2"o (2) the amount of
any profits derived from the collateral sales connected to the bad act, and
(3) the amount of research and development costs that the defendant
avoided.281 Unjust enrichment is calculated by analyzing the benefit to the
defendant in relation to the extent he was able to exploit and derive
economic value by use of the trade secret.282
(4) Price erosion with causality measure
Fourth, courts will look to "price erosion with causality" to measure
damages.2 11 Under this analysis, courts will calculate the value by noting the
275. See Reading Radio, Inc. v. Fink, 833 A.2d 199, 207 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) (stating that
"the diminution valuation requires that an appraiser value the same [property] at two points
in time, i.e., a 'before and after' analysis").
276. Sickles & Ayyar, supra note 269, at 267.
277. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l v. Holden Found. Seeds, Inc., 35 F.3d 1226, 1244 n.52 (8th Cir.
1994).
278. Id.
279. Sickles & Ayyar, supra note 269, at 267.
280. Disgorgement of profits is "[t]he act of giving up something (such as profits illegally
obtained) on demand or by legal compulsion." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 536 (9th ed. 2011).
281. Sickles & Ayyar, supra note 269, at 267.
282. Id.
283. Id.
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plaintiffs loss of profits due to a reduction in sales.2 8 For this valuation to
be allowed, there must be an identifiable element of causation between the
defendant's misappropriation and the erosion in the market price of the
trade secret.285 Thus, the misappropriation must have caused the plaintiff to
reduce his sales price to compete with the defendant who misappropriated
his trade secret.286
(5) Licensing royalty measure
Fifth, the courts will sometimes impose a licensing royalty on all of the
defendant's sales connected with the misappropriation.28 7 When applying
this standard for damage calculations, courts often utilize the application of
all or some of the fifteen factors for calculating reasonable royalties
provided in the patent case Georgia Pacific v. U.S. Plywood Corp.288 "A
reasonable royalty award attempts to measure a hypothetically agreed value
of what the defendant wrongfully obtained from the plaintiff."289 To
calculate this hypothetical amount, courts use expert testimony and assume
that there was a "suppositious meeting" between the parties, and the expert
attempts to calculate an amount that he believes that the parties would have
agreed upon.290 The final figure is based upon what the expert deems would
have been a fair licensing price at the time that the misappropriation
occurred.291
(6) Punitive damages measure
The sixth measure of economic trade secret damages is punitive
damages. The UTSA expressly provides for punitive damages in the event
that the misappropriation is "willful and malicious."292 The UTSA, however,
does cap the amount of punitive damages by stating that the damages may
284. Salisbury Labs., Inc. v. Merieux Labs., Inc., 735 F. Supp. 1555, 1579-80 (M.D. Ga.
1989).
285. Sickles & Ayyar, supra note 269, at 267.
286. Salisbury Labs., Inc., 735 F. Supp. at 1579-80.
287. Sickles & Ayyar, supra note 269, at 267.
288. See Georgia-Pac. Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y.
1970).
289. Vt. Microsystems, Inc. v. Autodesk, Inc., 88 F.3d 142, 151 (2d Cir. 1996).
290. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
291. Id.
292. See UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT WITH 1985 AMENDMENTS § 3(b) (1985).
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not be "in an amount... exceeding twice any award [of compensatory
damages]."293
B. Reporter's Shield as Applied to Bloggers
Even though the Internet is a relatively new tool for the dispersion of
information, the reporter's shield has existed in some form for many
years.294 One of the earliest accounts regarding the shield goes all the way
back to the founding era of the United States when Benjamin Franklin's
brother was imprisoned for refusing to name a confidential source.295
Despite its age, the effect of the reporter's shield remains the same-it
protects a journalist from the forced disclosure of a confidential source.296
This privilege is based upon two sources of law. First, the First
Amendment establishes the privilege in limited circumstances.29 7 Second,
state specific reporter's shield laws offer a far more specific and potent form
of protection when compared to the protections of the First Amendment.298
Today, courts are split on whether a blogger constitutes a traditional
journalist.2 99 To determine whether a blogger is entitled to the traditional
protections of the reporter's shield, this distinction primarily turns on the
precise language of the state reporter's shield law.
293. Id.
294. Sam J. Ervin, Jr., In Pursuit of a Press Privilege, 11 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 233, 234 (1974)
(quoting BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, AUTOBIOGRAPHY 30 (H. Weld ed., 1848)).
295. Id.
296. Harvard Law Review Ass'n, Protecting The New Media: Application of the
Journalist's Privilege to Bloggers, 120 HARV. L. REv. 996 (2007).
297. See U.S. CONsT. amend. I. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government
for a redress of grievances." Id. (emphasis added).
298. Id.
299. See O'Grady v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 72 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that
the reporter's privilege applies to bloggers); see also Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44
(D.D.C 1998) (holding that the reporter's privilege may apply to an online blogger). Contra
Too Much Media, LLC v. Hale, 20 A.3d 364 (N.J. 2011) (holding that the reporter's privilege
may not apply to a blogger to shield him from a defamation suit).
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1. Reporter's Shield Protection under the First Amendment
Protection
In the 1972 case Branzburg v. Hayes,300 the Supreme Court held that a
journalist does not have an absolute right to not testify when called before a
grand jury, but he has a limited right to protection under the First
Amendment."'o The Branzburg Court established a three-part balancing test
to determine whether a newsman possesses the right to refrain from
revealing a confidential source.302 Under this test, courts are to weigh the
freedom of the press against the public's interest in obtaining the
information.303 Reiterating the value of the journalist and his contribution
to the dissemination of information to the general public, Justice Powell
concluded by ensuring reporters that "the courts will be available [to
provide remedies] to newsmen under circumstances where legitimate First
Amendment interests require protection.""
2. State Survey of Reporter's Shield Protection
Currently, 40 states and the District of Columbia have enacted reporter's
shield laws protecting journalists.305 Only ten states have no reporter's
shield statutes.306
300. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
301. Id. at 709 (Powell, J., concurring).
302. Id. at 710.
303. Id. In Justice Stewart's dissent, he propounded a three-part test that courts should
apply to determine whether the privilege applies. Id. at 743 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice
Stewart stated that
the government must (1) show that there is probable cause to believe that the
newsman has information that is clearly relevant to a specific probable violation
of law; (2) demonstrate that the information sought cannot be obtained by
alternative means less destructive of First Amendment rights; and (3)
demonstrate a compelling and overriding interest in the information.
Id. (Stewart, J., dissenting).
304. Id. at 710.
305. Currently, the following 40 states, and the district of Columbia, have enacted state
reporter's shield statutes (note: each statute cited is the first substantive statute used in each
state's trade secret laws): Alabama (ALA. CODE § 12-21-142 (2011)); Alaska (ALASKA STAT.
§ 09.25.300 (2011)); Arizona (ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2237 (2011)); Arkansas (ARK. CODE
ANN. § 16-85-510 (2011)); California (CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2(b)); Colorado (COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 13-90-119 (1990)); Connecticut (CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-146t (2006)); Delaware (DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 10, § 4320 (2002)); District of Columbia (D.C. CODE § 16-4701 (1992)); Florida (FLA.
STAT. § 90.5015 (1998)); Georgia (GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-30 (1990)); Hawaii (proposed and
not yet enacted) (H.R. 2016, 26th Leg., Reg. Sess. 2012 (Haw. 2012)); Illinois (735 ILL. COMP.
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In O'Grady v. Superior Court,307 Apple, Inc. brought suit against Jason
O'Grady for allegedly disseminating Apple's trade secrets on O'Grady's
technology blog.308 The information source was undisclosed on the blog,
and when asked to provide the information, O'Grady raised the reporter's
shield privilege as a defense.o 9 The California shield law, which O'Grady
relied upon, is illustrative of most state shield statutes and provides that
[a] publisher, editor, reporter, or other person connected with or
employed upon a newspaper, magazine, or other periodical
publication ... shall not be adjudged in contempt ... for refusing
to disclose the source of any information procured while so
connected or employed for publication in a newspaper, magazine
or other periodical publication, or for refusing to disclose any
unpublished information obtained or prepared in gathering,
receiving or processing of information for communication to the
public.310
STAT. 5/8-901 (1991)); Indiana (IND. CODE § 34-46-4-2 (1998)); Kansas (KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 60-480 (2010)); Kentucky (Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.100 (West 1952)); Louisiana
(LA. REV. STAT ANN. § 45:1451 (2012)); Maine (ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 61 (2007));
Maryland (MD. CODE ANN. CTs. & JUD. PROC. § 9-112 (West 1988)); Michigan (MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 767A.6 (1995)); Minnesota (MINN. STAT. § 595.023 (1998)); Montana (MONT. CODE
ANN. § 26-1-902 (2009)); Nebraska (NEB. REv. STAT. § 20-145(1973)); Nevada (NEV. REV.
STAT. § 49.275 (1975)); New Jersey (N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-21 (West 1977)); New Mexico
(N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-6-7 (1973)); New York (N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h (McKinney
1990)); North Carolina (N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.11 (1999)); North Dakota (N.D. CENT.
CODE § 31-01-06.2 (1973)); Ohio (OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2739.12 (West 1953)); Oklahoma
(OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2506 (1994)); Oregon (OR. REV. STAT. § 44.520 (1973)); Pennsylvania
(42 PA. CONs. STAT. ANN. § 5942 (West 1976)); Rhode Island (R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-19.1-2
(1971)); South Carolina (S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11-100 (1993)); Tennessee (TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 24-1-208 (1973)); Texas (TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 22.021 (West 2009)); Utah
(UTAH R. EvID. 509 (2012)); Washington (WASH. REV. CODE § 5.68.010 (2007)); West
Virginia (W. VA. CODE § 57-3-10 (2011)); and Wisconsin (WIS. STAT. § 85.14 (2012)).
306. The following 10 states have not enacted legislation to establish a state reporter's
shield law: Idaho, Iowa, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, New Hampshire, South
Dakota, Utah, Virginia, and Wyoming.
307. O'Grady v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 72 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006).
308. Id. at 76. The trade secret information that was published on O'Grady's website was
information pertaining to an unreleased Apple product relating to its music software. Id. at
77.
309. Id. at 81.
310. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2(b) (emphasis added).
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Apple asserted that the California shield law did not protect O'Grady for
three reasons: (1) O'Grady's blog was not "legitimate journalism,"31' (2)
O'Grady was not a traditional reporter and thus not a Covered Person
under the shield law,3 12 and (3) O'Grady's blog was a not a Covered
Publication under the law."
a. Legitimate journalism requirement
Apple argued that the content of O'Grady's blog was not legitimate
journalism because it was not the journalistic reporting of the news but was
the verbatim posting of copies of Apple's trade secrets with no editorial
oversight or changes in the material.' Apple reminded the court that the
purpose behind a state reporter's shield law is to maintain open channels
for the dissemination of information to the general public, but it also argued
that O'Grady's dissemination of trade secrets did not qualify for legitimate
journalism because a reporter has no right to publicize trade secrets.315
Stunningly, the court stated, "We decline the implicit invitation to embroil
ourselves in questions of what constitutes 'legitimate journalis[m].' The
shield law is intended to protect the gathering and dissemination of news,
and that is what [O'Grady] did here."' Despite the fact that O'Grady
posted information that he knew was a closely-guarded trade secret, made
no substantive changes to the information, and provided no editorial
oversight, the court rationalized that his journalistic purposes were
legitimate because O'Grady was engaged in the dissemination of a
particular kind of information to an interested readership."
b. Covered person requirement
Changes in technology and society have made the lines between private
citizen and journalist exceedingly difficult to draw. This distinction may be
simplified by the aid of the statutory language, but it may also fall to the
discretion of the court as it did in O'Grady."' The California reporter's
shield statute ensures protection to a "publisher, editor, reporter, or other
311. O'Grady, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d. at 97 (internal quotation marks omitted).
312. Id. at 99.
313. Id. at 99-100.
314. Id. at 97.
315. Id.
316. Id. (emphasis added).
317. Id. at 98.
318. Id. at 115.
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person connected with or employed upon a newspaper, magazine, or other
periodical publication."3 19 The O'Grady court held that O'Grady was a
covered person because he posted legitimate journalism to the news site.320
The court stated that O'Grady was a "publisher" of the information because
he is "'[o]ne whose business is the issuing of books, newspapers, music,
engravings, or the like, as the agent of the author or
owner . .. and . .. distribution to the booksellers and other dealers, or to the
public."321 The court reasoned that the existence of an online blog is "'like"'
a newspaper or magazine for the purposes of employing O'Grady.322
c. Covered publication requirement
All state-specific reporter's shield statutes require that the disseminated
information be a "covered publication."3 23 The O'Grady court looked to the
text of the California reporter's shield statute, which covers a "newspaper,
magazine, or other periodical publication."3 24 A "newspaper," the court said,
"has always meant, and continues to mean, a regularly appearing
publication printed on large format, inexpensive paper," and did not apply
to the O'Grady case.3 25 The court then carefully analyzed "magazine" and
"other periodical publication," and concluded that O'Grady's blog could
potentially fall within the scope of each of these categories.326 In relation to
the magazine, the court reasoned that because there are many online
319. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2(b).
320. O'Grady, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d. at 99.
321. Id. (quoting 12 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 785 (2d ed. 1989)).
322. Id.
323. Covered publications are enumerated within the text of the state reporter's shield
statute. See, e.g., News Media Privilege, MD. CODE ANN. CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-112(a) (West
1988) (enumerating "newspapers," "magazines," "press associations," "news agencies," "wire
services," "radio," "television," and "any printed, photographic, mechanical, or electronic
means of disseminating news and information to the public" as covered publications under
the Maryland reporter shield statute).
324. O'Grady, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 99-100.
325. Id. at 100.
326. Id. The court did not conclusively state that blogs are included under "magazines"
and "other publications" because the court reasoned that the there was sufficient ambiguity
within the text of the reporter's shield statute. Id. Due to the ambiguity, under California law,
courts "attempt to ascertain the Legislature's purpose by taking its words in the sense in
which they were understood at the time the statute was enacted."' Id. (quoting Resure, Inc. v.
Superior Court, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 354, 359 (1996)).
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magazines-that have no print counterpart-O'Grady's blog was similar
and could potentially fall under its definition.327
As for the term "other periodical publication," the court employed the
canon of statutory construction ejusdem generis.3 28 This canon is used
"when a general word or phrase follows a list of specifics"; in such a case,
"the general word or phrase will be interpreted to include only items of the
same class as those listed."3 29 The O'Grady court stated that use of ejusdem
generis rests upon the premise that "if the Legislature had intended the
general words to be used in their unrestricted sense, it would not have
mentioned the particular things or classes of things which would in that
event become mere surplusage."330 The court reasoned that although blogs
were not in existence at the time that the California shield law was drafted
and enacted, through the use of ejusdem generis, the core purpose of the law
is effectuated by extending the meaning of "other periodical publication" to
include blogs.331
III. PROBLEM
Even though a corporation's trade secrets may be one if its most valuable
assets, current trade secret law has made it convenient and cost effective for
a company to misappropriate a trade secret that belongs to someone else.332
Generally, intellectual property values have a substantial impact on the
American economy. It has been estimated, as of 2005, that intellectual
property in the United States is valued anywhere from $5-5.5 trillion.333
This estimate is roughly worth 45% of the American gross domestic product
(GPD), and it is "greater than the GDP of any other nation in the world."3 4
The American Society for Industrial Security (ASIS) estimates that Fortune
1000 companies lost more than $49 billion in 1999 and as much as $59
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 594 (9th ed. 2009). Ejusdem generis literally means "of the
same kind or class." Id.
330. O'Grady, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d. at 101.
331. Id.
332. See Ahlert v. Hasbro, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 2d 509 (D.N.J. 2004); see also Softel, Inc. v.
Dragon Med. & Sci. Commc'ns, Inc., 118 F.3d 955 (2d Cir. 1997).
333. Kevin A. Hasset & Robert J. Shapiro, The Economic Value of Intellectual Property,
SONECON, LLc 2 (Oct. 2005), http://www.sonecon.com/docs/studies/IntellectualPropertyReport-
October2005.pdf.
334. Id.
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billion in 2001 as a result of trade secret misappropriation."' Collectively,
for all United States corporations, ASIS estimates that trade secret theft
costs corporations over $300 billon per year in the United States. 336 Under
current trade secret law, a victim of misappropriation may be left with little
or no legal recourse for the theft or unwarranted dissemination of his trade
secrets. Consider the following three factual scenarios.
The first scenario involves parties that are in federal court under
diversity jurisdiction.3 Under this scenario, Business A is from one state,
and Business B is from a different state. Business B is the defendant and is
being sued for the misappropriation of a trade secret. Business A is suing
because one of its employees left the company, now works in a different
state for Business B, and the employee revealed a confidential trade secret to
his new employer, Business B. Pursuant to applicable choice of law
provisions for this federal diversity action, the court applies the law of the
jurisdiction of Business B. Under this state's law, the trade secret
information does not qualify as a trade secret as it would under the law of
the state wherein Business A is incorporated. Because of this difference, the
plaintiff has no case because he cannot sue for misappropriation of that
which is not a trade secret.
The second scenario can arise where it is advantageous for a corporation
to risk a misappropriation lawsuit to steal a competitor's trade secrets.338
Under this scenario, Business A will contact Business B and will make an
offer to purchase the secret information. When Business B declines,
Business A-in bad faith-calculates a way to gain control of the trade
secrets. In bad faith, Business A offers an employee of Business B a generous
salary on the condition that the employee provides the coveted information
to Business A. Eventually, the employee leaves Business B, takes the offer to
work for Business A, and divulges the trade secrets. Once Business B finds
out about the misappropriation, its recourse is to file suit against Business
A. Nevertheless, even though Business A may be enjoined from practicing
335. Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive, Annual Report to Congress on
Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage-2002, FED'N OF AM. SCIENTISTS 1
(Feb. 2003), http://www.fas.org/irp/ops/ci/docs/2002.pdf.
336. Id. at 2.
337. This is based on the factual scenario presented in Ahlert v. Hasbro, Inc. See Ahlert v.
Hasbro, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 2d 509,511 (D.N.J. 2004).
338. This factual scenario is based upon the facts presented in E.L du Pont de Nemours &
Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc. and Advanced Marine Enterprises, Inc. v. PRC, Inc. See E.I. du Pont
de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 440 (4th Cir. 2011); Advanced Marine
Enters., Inc. v. PRC, Inc., 501 S.E.2d 148, 151-52 (Va. 1998).
[Vol. 7:87128
ABUSE OF THE JOURNALIST'S SHIELD
the trade secret, if Business A sufficiently destroyed the trade secret by
making it generally known, then the only remedy available will be monetary
damages.339 In many circumstances, the bad faith strategy of Business A will
effectively allow for a forced purchase of Business B's trade secrets.
The third scenario,340 like the misappropriation that took place in
O'Grady v. California, occurs when an employee takes a corporation's
valuable trade secret, provides the information to an Internet blog, and then
the blog posts the information for all of the world to see.34' Under this
scenario, the likelihood is high that the trade secret is destroyed because it is
no longer a secret.34 2 Like O'Grady, the blogger may be impervious to any
liability because of his state's reporter's shield statute.343 Under this scenario,
a company may destroy a competitor's trade secret and leave the victim
with no possible legal redress.
All of these scenarios are possible because of the problems with current
trade secret law. First, because each state has its own set of trade secret laws,
the results of litigation are unpredictable and costly to plaintiffs in trade
secret litigation. These results are inconsistent because of the differing
application of substantive state law, the inconsistency of trade secret
defenses, and the varying and inconsistent availability of state reporter's
shield statutes. Second, it is increasingly difficult for trade secret plaintiffs to
avail themselves of trade secret protection because of the strictness of the
reasonable measure of protection doctrine.3" This burden has become
increasingly onerous for corporations, requiring them to prove that a trade
secret was protected adequately, and as a result plaintiffs are losing cases
before they even begin. Third, the EEA is rarely used for the enforcement of
trade secrets. Because economic damages may not be a substantial
339. See supra Part II.A.10.b.(1) (explaining that when a trade secret is disseminated to
the extent that the trade secret owner alleges and proves that it is destroyed, the owner may
only seek monetary damages).
340. This factual scenario is based upon the facts presented in O'Grady v. Superior Court.
See O'Grady v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 72, 77-83 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006).
341. See id. (holding that the reporter's privilege applies to bloggers); see also Blumenthal
v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1998) (holding that the reporter's privilege applies to an
online blogger). Contra Too Much Media, LLC v. Hale, 20 A.3d 364 (N.J. 2011) (holding that
the reporter's privilege does not apply to a blogger to shield him from a defamation suit).
342. See Medtronic Vascular, Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., Civ.98-80-SLR,
2005 WL 388592, at *1 n.4 (D. Del. Feb. 2, 2005).
343. See supra Part II.B.2 (explaining the variations of state reporter's shield statutes).
344. See supra Part II.A.6.b (explaining the reasonable measure of protection doctrine as
it pertains to the definitional requirements for a trade under 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)).
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deterrence to some corporations, the lack of EEA enforcement has removed
the viability of trade secret misappropriation.
A. Inconsistency Leads to Confusion and a Lack of Continuity.
1. Choice of Law Conflicts Lead to Confusion and Disparate Results.
Absent a contract dictating a controlling choice of law agreement
between parties, pursuant to Klaxon v. Stentor Electric,"' a court must apply
the choice of law rules of the state where it sits.3* Illustrative of this, in
Softel, Inc. v. Dragon Medical,347 the court considered which choice of law
provision would apply in a trade secret case.14 ' The case was a diversity case
with parties from New Hampshire and Delaware, but the misappropriation
occurred in New York.14 1 Under Klaxon's rule of allowing the sitting court
to apply its state's choice of law rules, the court applied "an 'interest
analysis' to its choice of law, under which the law of the jurisdiction having
the greatest interest in the litigation controls."350 The Softel court concluded
that New York substantive law would apply because the plaintiff had offices
in New York, and the bad act occurred in New York."'
As evidenced by the Softel case, choice of law determinations may be
crucial in determining the outcome of trade secret litigation. In one
jurisdiction, information352 may qualify fully as a trade secret, whereas in
the forum jurisdiction, the substantive state law may not allow the
information to qualify as a trade secret. In Ahlert v. Hasbro, Inc.,353 this was
the result.354 The plaintiff was a toy designer from Oklahoma who travelled
to New Jersey to present a design for a toy water gun pressure system to a
potential buyer.55 In Oklahoma, which is one of the nine states that bases
all of its trade secret law upon the UTSA, the designer's research and
345. Klaxon v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
346. Id. at 494.
347. Softel, Inc. v. Dragon Med. & Sci. Commc'ns., Inc., 118 F.3d 955 (2d Cir. 1997).
348. Id. at 967.
349. Id. at 968.
350. Id. at 967.
351. Id. at 968.
352. See supra Part II.A.6.a (defining the term information within the context of trade
secret law).
353. Ahlert v. Hasbro, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 2d 509 (D.N.J. 2004).
354. Id. at 512.
355. Id.
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development satisfied all of the criteria to meet the UTSA definitional
elements of a trade secret.356 Nevertheless, the District Court for the District
of New Jersey applied a "governmental interest" test and concluded that
New Jersey law applied.357 New Jersey, one of the few states that utilizes the
common law restatement approach, requires that for the information to
constitute a trade secret, it must be used in business.' Since the
information had not officially been used in business, the plaintiff was left
without a remedy."'
2. Now You See It, Now You Don't: The Vanishing Inevitable
Disclosure Doctrine.
State substantive law also governs the availability of applicable arguments
that a plaintiff may assert. The Inevitable Disclosure theory protects a
company by enjoining all former employees from working for a competing
business where it is inevitable that the former employee will disclose the
information. 60 In Lam Research Corp. v. Deshmukh,361 the Ninth Circuit
applied the "most significant relationship" test to determine the applicable
law.362 The plaintiffs headquarters were located in California, and the
defendant lived in Washington.363 The court concluded that California law
applied to the case." This was fatal to the plaintiffs claim because he relied
upon the inevitable disclosure cause of action, which is available in
Washington but not in California."65 As a direct result of the variations in
the states' trade secret laws, at one moment the plaintiff had full use of the
356. Id.
357. Id. Under New Jersey's "governmental interest test" for determining choice of law, a
court must first identify "the policies underlying the laws of each interested jurisdiction and
then consider the contacts that each jurisdiction has with the parties. The determinative law
is that of the state with the greatest interest in governing the particular issues" of the case. Id.
358. Id. at 512-13.
359. Id. at 515.
360. IP Handbook, supra note 20, at 309.
361. Lam Research Corp. v. Deshmukh, 157 Fed. App'x 26 (9th Cir. 2005).
362. Id. at 27. The "most significant relationship" test considers the balancing of the
following factors: the place where the injury occurred; the place where the conduct causing
the injury occurred; the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation, and place of
business of the parties; and the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is
centered. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145(2) (1971)).
363. Id.
364. Id.
365. Id. at 28.
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inevitable disclosure claim, and then at the very next moment the claim
vanished, leaving the plaintiff with no cause of action.3*
3. Information Laundering: Protected Trade Secret Misappropriation
Under State Shield Statutes.
Perhaps the most egregious loophole in modern trade secret
jurisprudence is the use of reporter shield laws to allow the safe and
anonymous destruction of a trade secret-all without providing any
available remedy to the trade secret owner. In O'Grady,67 the court shied
away from regulating the bad faith dissemination of Apple's trade secret-
and it was all in the name of journalism. 6 ' If, however, a trade secret was
disseminated from a blog in a state like Virginia, then the plaintiff would be
able to adequately identify the defendant and bring a subsequent suit
because Virginia does not have a reporter's shield statute to protect a trade
secret defendant.
The reporter shield statutes are highly beneficial for the law and for the
American public. The problem arises when reporter's shield statutes are
used to conceal bad acts, like the misappropriation of trade secrets. Texas,
for instance, has ameliorated this problem by establishing two sets of shield
laws-a set of civil reporter's shield laws that apply to general
newsgathering and a completely separate shield law that applies only to
criminal actions.369
B. Many States' Trade Secret Laws Place Too Onerous of a Burden on
Businesses to Prove the Existence of a Trade Secret.
Even though the comments section of the UTSA states that "[t]he courts
do not require that extreme and unduly expensive procedures be taken to
protect trade secrets against flagrant industrial espionage," this perception
differs markedly from the reality in trade secret litigation. 370 This reality has
been expressed by many courts requiring a written confidentiality
agreement as a necessary predicate to the enforcement of any trade secret
366. Id.
367. See supra Part II.B.2 (explaining the impact of the O'Grady decision).
368. See O'Grady v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 72,98 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006).
369. Compare TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 22.021 (West 2009) (Texas civil
journalist's privilege), with TEx. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 38.11 (West 2009) (Texas
criminal journalist's privilege).
370. See UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT WITH 1985 AMENDMENTS § 1 cmt. at 7-8 (1985).
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protection.7 Some jurisdictions have contemplated that a confidentiality
agreement is necessary for enforcing a trade secret;372 other jurisdictions
have noted that an "explicit promise of confidentiality is not necessary if the
recipient of the information knew or should have known that the
information" was proprietary.7
Another example of this onerous burden is when courts demand too
strict of an application of the company's "reasonable measures of secrecy"
with regard to the trade secret.374 This occurs when courts stretch the
reasonable measures of secrecy standard too far by holding that a trade
secret owner did not take reasonable measures due to a mere technicality. In
Motor City Bagels, Inc. v. American Bagel Co.,375 the District Court for the
District of Maryland held that a trade secret owner did not take reasonable
measures of secrecy when he provided an "extensive confidentiality
agreement" to potential investors, but the trade secret owner did not receive
all of the confidentiality forms back from the investors."' In Ruckleshaus v.
Monsanto Co.,"' the Supreme Court held that the disclosure of a trade
secret "to others who are under no obligation to protect the confidentiality
of the information" extinguishes the property right in the disclosure.7
Applying the Ruckleshaus rule to the facts of Motor City Bagels would and
should produce a different result. In Motor City Bagels, the defendant had
knowledge of the proprietary nature of the information by virtue of the
confidentiality agreement he had in his possession.37 9 This constructive
knowledge should have been enough to put the defendant on notice that the
371. See, e.g., Dicks v. Jensen, 768 A.2d 1279, 1284 (Vt. 2001) (holding that a
confidentiality agreement is necessary for the enforcement of a trade secret claim regarding
secret ingredients for a pizza crust recipe).
372. See, e.g., Bus. Designs, Inc. v. Midnational Graphics, LLC, No. 01-1087, 2002 WL
987971, at *6 (Hecht, J., dissenting) (Iowa Ct. App. May 15, 2002).
373. See, e.g., Zemco Mfg., Inc. v. Navstar Int'l Transp. Corp., 759 N.E.2d 239, 247 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2001). The best practice is to secure a written confidentiality agreement in all
circumstances, but the written requirement should not be a prerequisite to the reasonable
efforts requirement.
374. See supra Part II.A.6.b (describing the reasonable measures of secrecy standard
under 18 U.S.C. § 1839).
375. Motor City Bagels, LLC v. Am. Bagel Co., 50 F. Supp. 2d 460 (D. Md. 1999).
376. Id. at 480.
377. Ruckleshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
378. Id. at 1002.
379. Motor City Bagels, L.L.C., 50 F. Supp. 2d at 480.
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information was proprietary; thus, the end result should have satisfied the
reasonable measures requirement.
Additionally, different jurisdictions-even jurisdictions that follow the
same substantive trade secret laws-have varying standards for
determining whether an owner maintained reasonable measures of secrecy.
Illustrative of the inconsistency that varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction
are lines of trade secret cases that focus on proper disposal methods for
proprietary information. Some jurisdictions, as evidenced by Frank W,
Winne & Son, Inc. v. Palmer,"o hold that a trade secret owner has failed to
maintain the reasonable efforts standard when the trade secret information
is placed in a dumpster that is serviced by the local garbage collector."' The
Winne court, applying Pennsylvania law, 8 relied on the Supreme Court's
holding in California v. Greenwood3 83 and held that a trade secret owner
Ihas no reasonable expectation of privacy from prying eyes" in the contents
of his trash."
380. Frank W. Winne & Sons, Inc. v. Palmer, No. 91-2239, 1991 WL 155819 (E.D. Pa.
Aug. 7, 1991).
381. Id. at *3. In Winne, the proprietary information in question was a listing of
customers, invoices, and other business documents that qualified as trade secrets belonging
to a rope manufacturing company. Id. at *1-2. The documents were placed in a bag of trash
that was discovered by the investigator of a competitor. Id. at *1. The competitor hired an
investigator to pilfer through Winne's dumpster hoping to find trade secrets. Id. The
documents in question were enclosed within a bag of trash in a dumpster that was located on
the immediate property. Id.
382. Pennsylvania's trade secret law in 1991, when Winne was decided, was reflective of
the common law Restatement approach. In 2004, Pennsylvania changed to a partial UTSA
jurisdiction. See supra Part II.A.9.
383. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988). The Greenwood Court held that refuse
is left
at the curb for the express purpose of conveying it to a third party, the trash
collector, who might himself have sorted through [the] trash or permitted
others, such as the police, to do so. Accordingly, having deposited their garbage
"in an area particularly suited for public inspection and, in a manner of
speaking, public consumption, for the express purpose of having strangers take
it," respondents could have had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the
inculpatory items that they discarded.
Id. at 40 (citations omitted). Even though Greenwood is a Fourth Amendment
criminal case, the Winne court applied its rule and held that a trade secret owner
cannot maintain the secret status of his trade secret in an area where he does not
have any reasonable expectation of privacy. Frank W. Winne & Sons, Inc., 1991
WL 155819, at *4.
384. Id.
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On the opposite end of the spectrum, some jurisdictions hold that a
person maintains the reasonable efforts of secrecy standard when he
discards his information in the exact manner of that in Winne. In Steven
Slesinger, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co.,385 a court applying California law held
that any information that is obtained following the Winne method of using
an investigator to retrieve the information from the trash is an
impermissible practice to obtain corporate information.386 The court held
that this "misconduct . . . was deliberate and egregious-more than
adequate to invoke the [lower] court's exercise of its inherent power ....
C. Is the EEA a Secret? The Lack of Use of the EEA
Out of the thousands of trade secret cases that are tried every year in the
United States, a disproportionate number of these cases are actually
prosecuted under the EEA. In 2010, for example, the FBI opened 150 new
intellectual property cases, while only 40 of those cases were related to the
theft of trade secrets, and only 26 were specific to the EEA.m' This was an
increase of 42% as compared to 2009,38 but it was only a minimal amount
of trade secret litigation in comparison to the 482 trade secret cases that
were tried in federal courts during 2008.390 These statistics do not include
cases that were heard in state courts, which are also eligible for EEA
prosecution in most circumstances. According to these statistics, the
bottom line is that only .05% of all trade secrets cases are prosecuted under
the EEA.
385. Stephen Slesinger, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 66 Cal. Rptr. 3d. 268 (Cal. Ct. App.
2007).
386. Id. at 293.
387. Id.
388. Press Release, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice Joins in
Launch of Administration's Strategic Plan on Intellectual Property Enforcement as Part of
Ongoing IP Initiative (June 22, 2010), available at http://www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/press-
releases/department-of-justice-joins-in-launch-of-administration20l9s-strategic-plan-on-
intellectual-property-enforcement-as-part-of-ongoing-ip-initiative.
389. Gordon M. Snow, Statement Before the Senate Judiciary Committee in Washington,
D.C., FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (June 22, 2010),
http://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/intellectual-property-law-enforcement-efforts.
390. David S. Almeling et al., A Statistical Analysis of Trade Secret Litigation in Federal
Courts, 45 GONz. L. REV. 291, 299 (2010).
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IV. PROPOSAL
A. Trade Secret Law Should Become an Exclusively Federal Domain Like
Copyrights, Trademarks, and Patents.
Sam Dedio manages funds for the Swiss bank Julius Baer.391 These new
funds have extremely limited assets, and years ago Dedio would have had to
go to the trouble of finding brokers to sell the funds, and finding these
brokers would drive up Dedio's costs immensely.3 92 Today, however,
investors like Dedio do not need to find brokers to sell for them because
they can use the Internet to do it themselves. With these cost savings,
investors can quickly earn the ratings that they need to become high-level
investors. This is all possible for Dedio and millions of other business
owners because the Internet makes "even small companies global now.""'
Due to the impact of the Internet and modern commerce, trade secrets
should fall under federal court jurisdiction like all other intellectual
property. Currently, trade secrets are the only form of intellectual property
that are governed by state law. Article I, section 8, clause 8 of the United
States Constitution provides that Congress has the power "[t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries."" Under this clause, Congress is given the authority to
establish federal patent and copyright law. Trademark protections-which
are also governed by federal law-are not created by Article I, section 8,
clause 8, but are established pursuant to the authority of the Commerce
Clause.395 Like trademarks, the express language of the EEA invokes the
authority of the Commerce Clause.9 6 The language of section 1832(a) states
that a trade secret defendant must have the "intent to convert a trade secret,
that is related to or included in a product that is produced for or placed in
391. Michael Maiello, Ten Markets Transformed by the Internet, FORBES (Oct. 25, 2007,
10:25 PM), http://www.forbes.com/2007/10/24/markets-transformed-internet-markets-
marketsp07-cxmm-1025internet.html.
392. Id.
393. Id.
394. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
395. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The Commerce Clause states that Congress has the
power "[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with
the Indian Tribes." Id.
396. 18 U.S.C. § 1832(a) (2006).
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interstate or foreign commerce."m3  Just as trademark enforcement is
established under the constitutional authority of the Commerce Clause, so
too is trade secret protection by virtue of the EEA.m
The unification of state intellectual property law by means of federal
preemption is not new. Just as trade secrets are currently subject to the laws
of the states, trademark law also used to be subject to the laws of each state.
When the Lanham Act 399 was enacted in 1947, Congressman Fritz G.
Lanham, the Act's sponsor, stated that "[t]he purpose of [the Act] is to
protect legitimate business and the consumers of the country."400 The Senate
Report for the Lanham Act elaborated further by stating that the purpose of
federalized trademark law serves two primary purposes.40 1 First, the federal
trademark law was enacted "to protect the public so it may be confident that,
in purchasing a product bearing a particular trade-mark which it favorably
knows, it will get the product which it asks for and wants to get."402 The
second goal is to protect the trademark's owner. This is accomplished
ensuring that "where the owner of a trade-mark has spent energy, time, and
money in presenting to the public the product, he is protected in his
investment from its misappropriation by pirates and cheats." 3 Thus,
Congress's goal in passing trademark legislation was a dual one: to protect
both the owner and the general public.4"
One way of accomplishing this goal was to create uniform legal rights
and remedies that were appropriate for a "national economy."40 s Prior to the
congressional vote to federalize trademark law, Congress noted that
trademark protection was "entirely a State matter," and the result of this
piecemeal approach was that there were almost "as many different varieties
of common law as there are States."406 Congress correctly observed that a
person's right to a trademark "in one State may differ widely from the rights
which [that person] enjoys in another." The House Committee on
397. Id.
398. Id.
399. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1129 (2006).
400. 92 CONG. REc. 7524 (1946) (emphasis added).
401. S. REP. No. 1333, at 3 (1946), reprinted in 1947 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1275.
402. Id. (emphasis added).
403. Id. (emphasis added).
404. Id.
405. H.R. REP. No. 944, at 4 (1939).
406. Id.
407. Id.
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Trademarks and Patents, recognizing that "trade is no longer local, but ...
national[,]" saw the need for "national legislation along national lines [to]
secur[e] to the owners of trade-marks in interstate commerce definite
rights."40s
The purpose of a federal system of civil trade secret laws would mirror
the purposes of the federal system of trademark law. First, its purpose
would be to protect the general consumers. Consumers will be protected by
virtue of the economic impact that the federal system could have on
corporations, which produce goods or services that are used within
interstate commerce. With the Fortune 1000 companies incurring $59
billion in expenses annually as a result of trade secret misappropriation,40 9
there is no doubt that a federal system will help to ameliorate the associated
financial burdens that arise as a result of trade secret protection and
misappropriation. Second, its purpose also would be to benefit business
owners through a federalized, uniform set of trade secret laws. With a
uniform standard of laws established by Congress, each business owner will
know what he needs to do to protect all of his intellectual property. A
uniform system of laws will aid the business owner in understanding how
properly to decide between a patent, a copyright, or a trade secret when
seeking to protect his intellectual property. Also, a uniform approach will
allow all American businesses the predictability and protection that the law
is intended to afford American citizens.
B. Implementation of Federalized System Under the EEA or a New Scheme
Trade secret law is already partially included within the federal laws of
the EEA.410 Under the current EEA, trade secrets are only enforced by
means of criminal prosecution." A civil remedy is available under the EEA,
but it is only available to provide an injunction as a concomitant effect of
the criminal prosecution.412 To establish a proper system that will effectuate
the goals of a uniform system of federal trade secret law, Congress should
include provisions within the EEA that will precisely address the
inconsistencies that are found within current trade secret law. Within the
statutory language of the new system, it would prove helpful if Congress
408. Id.
409. Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive, supra note 335, at 1.
410. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-1839 (2006).
411. See id. §§ 1831-1832.
412. See id. § 1836.
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would expand the statute to maintain the current section of the EEA4 13 and
to also add a separate section that precisely addresses civil enforcement and
provides for an array of civil remedies.
C. Piercing the Reporter's Shield: Specialized Federal Provisions that Will
Prevent Trade Secret Misappropriation Protection by Bloggers.
Within this unified system, it would be helpful for Congress to include a
provision that will expressly preempt any state's reporter's shield law when
trade secret dissemination is at issue. An excellent example of how this
could potentially function is found within the Texas reporter's shield laws
where Texas has incorporated a reporter's shield statute expressly for civil
actions and enacted a second reporter's shield statute that applies when
criminal activity is implicated."'
Under the civil provision of Texas's journalist privilege, the statute offers
the same privilege as nearly all state reporter's shield statutes-the
immunity for the journalist not to reveal his source."' Nevertheless, Texas
has enacted a separate journalist shield statute that is only applicable when
criminal activity is involved.4 16 Instead of providing one carte blanche
provision that covers a journalist in either a civil or criminal case, this
statute-focusing only on criminal actions-limits the efficacy of the shield
under four circumstances." First, the shield does not apply if the journalist
witnessed the source committing a felony.1 Second, the shield does not
apply when the source has confessed or admitted to the reporter that he has
committed a felony." Third, the shield does not apply when there is
413. Under a new uniform system, the criminal section of the EEA could be invoked
when a defendant in bad faith forces a purchase upon a trade secret owner.
414. Compare TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 22.021 (West 2009) (Texas civil
journalist's privilege), with TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.11 (West 2009) (Texas
criminal journalist's privilege).
415. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 22.023 (West 2009).
416. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.11 (West 2009).
417. Also within sections 1-3, the entity seeking the information from the reporter must
exercise "reasonable efforts" to procure the information from all other possible sources of the
confidential information. Id. § 4(a)(1)-(3). Under section 4, there may be disclosure in the
absence of reasonable efforts only when disclosure is "reasonably necessary to stop or
prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm." Id. § 4(a)(4).
418. Id. § 4(a)(1).
419. Id. § 4(a)(2).
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probable cause to believe that the source participated in a felony offense.420
Fourth, the shield does not apply when the disclosure of the information is
reasonably necessary to prevent the death or substantial bodily harm to a
third party.42' Under all four of these circumstances, the Texas legislature
has taken the reporter shield statute out of play, and defendants may not
hide behind the shield but must reveal their confidential source.
Within a new federal trade secret law scheme, an express preemption
clause to override any state reporter's shield statute would eliminate the
problem presented in O'Grady v. Superior Court.422 This provision would
effectively bar a party from refusing to reveal the source from which he
received his confidential information. Specifically, Congress should
maintain the second and third limitations, as expressed in the Texas
journalist's privilege statute, when criminal activity is involved.42 ' The
second limitation is that any journalist's shield protection will be dissolved
when the source has confessed or admitted to committing the appropriation
of a trade secret.4 24 The third limitation takes effect when there is probable
cause to believe that the source has wrongfully obtained the trade secret
information.425 Under both of these provisions, it is also required that the
person seeking the information must take reasonable measures to obtain
the information from other channels before the journalist's shield may be
pierced.4 26 This provision of a uniform trade secret act will allow all trade
secret owners to protect their trade secrets from the threat of destruction by
way of dissemination through the Internet.
V. CONCLUSION
Congress should enact a uniform system of federal trade secret laws that
will unify the currently divided topic of trade secret law. Under this new
scheme, the uniform system should do the following: allow for a uniform
definition of the reasonable measures necessary for trade secret protection,
provide a uniform section either allowing or disallowing the inevitable
420. Id. § 4(a)(3).
421. Id. § 4(a)(4).
422. O'Grady v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 72 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006).
423. The criminal activity that will allow for the piercing of the reporter's shield should
include any felony crime-including a violation of the EEA.
424. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 38.11 § 4(a)(2) (West 2009).
425. See id. § 4(a)(3).
426. Id.
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disclosure doctrine, enact a statutory provision that will preempt the use of
a state's reporter's shield statute, and criminally prosecute trade secret
defendants under the EEA far more frequently. This uniform system would
help alleviate the rising costs and commercial theft that many of America's
top companies face today. Most of all, the new test would aid the American
public by reducing overall costs to corporations and would provide a
structured and predictable framework that business owners need to
effectively run their businesses.
